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This paper investigates the inﬂuence of invariance axioms in the decompositionof observed
poverty variations into growth and inequality effects. After a complete and critical review of
the invariance axioms suggested in the literature, we show that few information is needed for
the ordering of the effects respectivelyobtained through scale, translation and intermediate in-
variance. Using Chinese data for the period 1990-2003, we ﬁnd that some commonly observed
results of the decomposition are contingent to the invariance axiom choices whilst other are
robust to changes in ethical preferences.
JEL classiﬁcation: I32, D63, D31.
Keywords: Poverty, inequality effect, growth effect, decomposition, scale invariance, transla-
tion invariance, intermediate invariance, China.
Introduction
Does multiplying the incomes of each members of a population by the same scalar increases,
decreases or leaves income inequality unchanged? Does adding the same absolute amount of
income to each member of a population increases, decreases or leaves inequality unchanged?
It is very interesting to note that people may give very different answers to questions related to
axiomatic choices, and thus express so heterogeneous feelings about how inequality should be
deﬁned and measured. Using questionnaires with large samples of students (generally under-
graduate students in economics), Amiel and Cowell (1992, 1997, 1999, 2001) noticed that very
few respondants were likely to support most of the core traditional axioms used in the inequal-
ity and poverty measurement literature. In particular, the majority of the respondants was not in
agreementwiththeclassical opinionthatdoublingeachincome inadistributiondoesnotchange
the degree of inequality. Such a reaction against this scale invariance axiom is not really surpris-
ing since there is no unanimous approval of this axiom among economists. For instance, many
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1famous scholars like Dalton (1920) or Kolm (1976a) also expressed heterodox views about how
additional incomes should (or could) be divided among individuals so as to preserve the degree
of inequality.1
Questioning the desirability of the properties of any inequality or poverty measure is not a
trivial exercise since it may have a direct impact on policy decisions. International income in-
equalities, that is inequality among countries, are a good illustration of the importance of the
heterogeneity of feelings about inequality and its consequences. Many individuals will focus on
the increasing absolute differences between mean incomes while otherswill just consider thede-
creasing relative differencesbetween nations. The ﬁrstones maycertainlyconclude thatinequal-
ities have risen during the last decades, while the second would support the opposite point of
view. The consequence is that very different policies, in particular aid and development policies,
could be recommended on the basis of such heterogeneous interpretations of observed trends.
However,thesubjectofthepresentpaperisnotinternationalincomeinequalitiesbutpresents
similarinterpretationissues. Herewewouldliketoemphasizetheimportanceofaxiomaticchoices
on the analysis of poverty variations. Since the pioneering developments of Jain and Tendulkar
(1990);KakwaniandSubbarao(1990)andDattandRavallion(1992), thedecompositionsofpoverty
variations into growth and inequalityeffects havebecome verypopular in empiricalstudies since
it is a very elegant way of estimating the relative contribution of the increase in mean income
and of the changes in the relative distribution of incomes. In the present studies we stress the
crucial role of ethical preferences involved in the general conception of inequality since it deﬁnes
the frontier between what can be considered as “pure” growth, that is growth without inequality
change, and“pure”redistribution, thatischange in therelativedistribution with aconstant mean
income. This remark is particularly relevant for some poverty measures like the headcount index
that are compatible with many rival axioms and thus that leave room for personal judgments.
Consequently, the same variation of poverty may be mostly attributed to “pure” growth or “pure”
redistribution depending of individual tastes, a result that may lead to great misunderstandings
and inefﬁcient policy recommendations if researchers do not explicitly explains the axiomatic
basis involved in their decomposition of observed poverty trends.
In the present paper, we ﬁrst review the different techniques used for the decomposition of
poverty spells (section 1) and then the different inequality views which have been presented and
formalized in the inequality and poverty measurement literature (section 2). More precisely, we
focus on inequality views that are attributed to “rightist” and “leftist” political opinions accord-
ing to Kolm (1976a). A “rightist” is based on the opinion that inequality does not change when
incomes grow at the same rate as mean income through the curse of economic development
whereas “leftist” individuals feel that the degree of inequality is constant when economic agents’
incomes increase by the same amount as mean income does.2 Our review also includes interme-
1 Concerning the opposition between scale invariance and translation invariance that will be treated in the next
sections, Kolm (1976a, p. 419) argue that “it is no less legitimate to attach the inequality between two incomes to their
difference than to their ratio.”
2 The“leftist”and“rightist”labels arelinkedtothefrenchpoliticalcontextandtheideologicaldifferences between
left-wingand right-wingopinions. Kolm(1976a) introducestheseexpressionswitha referencetodebates thatoccured
for the Grenelle agreements in 1968 which decreed the same proportional increase in wages for all employees. Kolm
reports (p. 419) that “the Radicals felt bitter and cheated; in their view, this widely increased incomes inequality.” In
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diateviewsthatconstitutescompromisesbetweenthesetwopolarcasesandforwhichweprovide
a new deﬁnition. Among the formalized intermediate views that are presented in the paper, we
argue that the non-linear view suggested by Krtscha (1994) and Yoshida (2005) is the sole relevant
way of expressing an intermediate inequality view for poverty decompositions.
Considering the theoretical implications of invariance related axiom changes on the growth-
inequality decompositions of poverty spells (section 3), we show that few information is needed
so as to order the different growth and inequality effects based on these “rightist”, “leftist” and
intermediateviews inthecase of theheadcountindex. Consequently, we caneasily predict which
interpretation differences should be observed within this set of inequality conceptions for the
same observed poverty variations.
An application on Chinese data during the period 1990-2003 is then provided in section 4.
The conclusions thatregularlyappearin empiricalstudies (Fanetal., 2002; WanandZhang, 2006;
Chen and Ravallion, 2007) are that growth is the main contributor to poverty reduction and that
relative distribution changes hampers the beneﬁcial effects of growth on poverty. Our aim is thus
to test if these conclusion are robust to changes in inequality views. Our results show that up-
holders of the “leftist” view will consider thatinequality changes havecontributed to the increase
of the number of poor people in China during the whole period whilst those who believe in a
“rightist” view will support the opposite conclusion. An other important consequence is that
considering rival inequality views may reverse conclusions when comparing the value of the es-
timated effects between many subperiods. In the case of China, these methodological consid-
erations should be seen as crucial since it modiﬁes conclusions that concerns about one ﬁfth of
the world population. On the other hand, some traditional conclusions are strengthened like the
need to improve redistribution so as to ﬁght extreme poverty.
Finally, section 5 concludes with some remarks about economists’ practices. In particular, we
argue that economists should, at least, be aware of the normative implications of the tools that
they use for purely positive analysis of observed economic phenomena.
1 The decomposition of poverty spells
In thepresent paper,our attentionis conﬁned to absolute povertymeasuresΘ, which can be fully
characterized by a poverty line z, the mean income µ and a vector of inequality measures π that
account for all inequality features of the observed distribution.3 Thus, poverty at time t is given
section 2, we show that the “leftist” view implies a more egalitarian way of sharingadditional incomes among individ-
uals that the “rightist”view. . As the expressions of “leftist” and “rightist” views are common in the invariance-related
literature and do not yield confusions like the terms absolute and relative (see note 3), we will make an intensive use
of them throughoutthe paper. However, we are conscious that these expressions may not correspond to the reality of
political doctrinesandmovements, especially outsidethefrenchcontext. Fora justiﬁcationof thedifferences between
“leftist” and “rightist”inequality views in terms of utility functions, see note 15.
3 In the present study, absolute poverty refers to the use of an absolute poverty line which is only deﬁned by the
amount needed to satisfy some “basic” needs (see Sen, 1983, 1985, for further details). So it contrasts with relative
poverty in which the poverty line is set with respect to the observed distribution of income. Sometime, absolute (rel-
ative) poverty corresponds to poverty views which comply with translation (scale) invariance axioms (cf. section 2).
The adjectives absolute and relative are also used in the context of inequality measurement and refers to indices that
are respectively deﬁned as differences and ratios of mean income with the corresponding equally distributed equiva-
lent income (Atkinson, 1970; Kolm, 1976a,b), i.e. the per capita income which if equally shared among the population
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by:
Θt =Θ(zt,µt,πt). (1.1)
In order to compare values of Θ at different points of time, zt is held constant (we assume
incomearemeasuredinrealterms). So zt = z. Consistentwiththisassumptionandequation(1.1)
is the intuition that variations of Θ can be decomposed into different components that can be
attributed to growth and variations in inequality. In mathematical terms, our intention is to get:
Θt+k −Θt =Gt,t+k +Dt,t+k (1.2)
where G and D are respectively the growth and inequality components of poverty.4 The growth
component is the variation of the poverty measure that is only due to change in mean income,
that is when inequality is held constant. Similarly, the inequality component is the variation of
the poverty measure that can be attributed to variations of the elements of π. This technique
was initiated by Jain and Tendulkar (1990); Kakwani and Subbarao (1990) and Datt and Ravallion
(1992) and is now standard in the poverty literature. It should be acknowledged that this decom-
position isapurelystatisticaldecomposition anddiffersfromtheeconometricanalysis, like Chen
andRavallion(2007), inthesensethatitdoesnotaccountforthecorrelationsbetweengrowthand
variations of the degree of inequality (whatever the direction of the causality, if it does exist).
The decomposition of poverty spells can be carried in different ways, depending on whether
initial or ﬁnal values are used for the ﬁxed element of each component. In the present paper,
we choose to focus on the two most widely used decomposition techniques namely the one
suggested by Datt and Ravallion (1992) and the Shapley decomposition developed by Shorrocks
(1999) and Kakwani (2000). The Datt and Ravallion (1992) procedure is characterized by the use
of the initial values as references for the computation of each effects and thus by the presence of
a residual term. The growth and inequality effects are then deﬁned by the following equations:
Gt,t+k =Θ(z,µt+k,πt)−Θ(z,µt,πt), (1.3)
Dt,t+k =Θ(z,µt,πt+k)−Θ(z,µt,πt). (1.4)
In the context of a multi-period analysis, this technique proves to be time-transitive when
the same distribution is used as reference for the computation of the effects for each period.5
For recent application of this technique, see Fan et al. (2002) for urban China from 1992 to 1998,
Contreras (2003) for Chile duringthe period 1990-1996, Kappelet al. (2005) for Uganda from 1992
to 2002 and Ferreira et al. (2006) for Brazil during the period 1981-2004.
However, this method has been heavily criticized since it generally does not provide a perfect
decomposition of Θt+k−Θt. Theevidence shows thattheresidual component of this decomposi-
tionisgenerallyimportantandcannotbeeasilyinterpreted. Toavoidthisshortcoming,Shorrocks
wouldyieldthesametotalwelfareastheobservedincomedistribution(forashortreviewofthelinksbetweenabsolute
indices, relativeindices, scale invarianceand translationinvariance,see Fleurbaey, 1996). In order to avoid confusion,
we will not make use of these expressions throughoutthe rest of the paper.
4 In the case of theDatt and Ravallion (1992) approach, thedecomposition is not exact and a residual term should
be added.
5 This propertyis called sub-period additivity in Datt and Ravallion (1992).
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(1999), using the Shapley-value from the cooperative game theory, and Kakwani (2000), using an
axiomatic approach, provide a decomposition framework, so that i) the decomposition is exact
(there is no residual components), ii) the variation of the poverty measure is positive (negative)
when both the growth and the inequality components are positive (negative), and iii)the value of
the growth (inequality) component between t and t +k is the opposite of its value between t +k























Recent illustrations of this decomposition technique include Kolenikov and Shorrocks (2005)
for Russia in the mid 90s, Baye (2006) for Cameroon during the period 1984-1996 and Wan and
Zhang(2006) forruralChina duringtheperiod1988-2000.6 Despite its attractiveness, theShapley
decomposition is not the panacea since it can be proved that the estimated effects are not time
transitive.7 However, since our objective is to question economists current practices, it does not
matter which particular decomposition technique is the right one.8 This explains why this paper
focuses on the decompositions corresponding to equations (1.3) to (1.6).
2 Invariance and the decomposition of poverty variations
From a technical point of view, the estimation of the growth and inequality components of the
poverty spells implies the computation of intermediate, or counterfactual, values for the chosen
poverty measure, that is the values that would be reached by the poverty measure if only µ or π
changed between the dates t and t +k. The design of these intermediate values requires an ex-
plicit formulation of what inequality means, in particular which ethical values are involved in the
concept of inequality used for the analysis. Of particular interest for the decomposition exercise
is the concept of invariance that will be extensively discussed through the next paragraphs.
Consider an income distribution X of size n > 2 with n ∈ N∗. Incomes are deﬁned on the set
Dα : [α,+∞). Each distribution X is then drawn from the set Dα =
 
n∈N∗ Dn
α. Sometime Dα is
6 Kolenikov and Shorrocks (2005) prime interest is not dynamic but regional decomposition of the variations of
poverty.
7 In order to get growth and inequality components that respect this property, Kakwani (2000) suggests using the























when the total observed period is 1 to s with 1 6 t 6 t +k 6 s. However, even if these effects are time transitive and
yield aperfectdecomposition,they presenttheundesirablefeatureofbeingpath-dependentsincetheyalso depend of
theincomedistributionsduringtheperiods 1...t−1, t+1...t+k−1 and t+k+1...s. So twoeconomies with thesame
income distributions in t and t +k may present different values of ˜ Gt,t+k and ˜ Dt,t+k if they do not share the same
evolution during the period of analysis. To our knowledge, Kakwani (2000) is the sole application of these formula.
8 For more critics of the aforementioned decomposition techniques, see Muller (2006).
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restricted to thenonnegative or strictly positive orthantof the n-dimensionalEuclidean space Rn
withtheorigindeleted. SuchsetswillberespectivelynotedD+ andD++. Eachvector X isordered
so that x1 6 x2...6 xn. AninequalityindexΨisamappingofDα intoR+ suchthatΨ(X1)<Ψ(X2)
implies that X1 is considered as less unequal than X2.
For the sake of simplicity, a traditional assumption is Ψ(µI) = 0 ∀µ ∈ R++ with I being a n-
vector of 1.9 We also impose as minimum requirements the respect of the core anonymity, conti-
nuityandpopulationaxioms.10 Inthefollowingparagraphs,wewillmakeuseofthePigou-Dalton
principle of transfers such that progressive (regressive) transfers lower (increase) inequality.1112
The respect of the anonymity axiom and of the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers imply that Ψ
is S-convex (Dasgupta et al., 1973).13 However, this principle of transfers can be debated (see for
instance Amieland Cowell 1992 orChateauneufandMoyes 2005) and will sometime conﬂict with
other axioms. So, though it will be considered as a desired property, Ψ may sometime not respect
the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers.






where Φ is a continuous increasing function Φ :D→D. Such an axiom is necessary for the com-
parison of income distributions with different means.14 So invariance can be seen as the way
of sharing an additional income in order to leave the judgment on inequality unchanged.15 Re-
9 In the case of the inequality measure deﬁned by Alonso-Villar and del Rio (2007a), this condition may not be
respected since its domain generally does not include distributions were incomes are equally shared. The underlying
invarianceaxiom is presented in section 2.3.1.
10 Chakravarty(1999) isa fairlycomprehensivereviewofthemost commonaxioms used intheinequalitymeasure-
ment related literature. Anonymity, also called symmetry, horizontal equity or equal treatment of equals, means that
Ψ(PX) = Ψ(X) with P being any permutation matrix of size n×n. Continuity implies that marginal variations of any
element of X do not cause large variations of the measure P. Finally, a measure respects the population axiom, also
called replicationinvarianceaxiom, if a m-replicationof X exhibit thesame degreeof inequalityas X, whatever X ∈D.
11 A transfer is progressive (regressive) if it increases (decreases) the income of an individual at the expense of (in
favour of) a richest individual without changing their relative position in the distribution. A weaker version of the
principle version would requireregressive(progressive) transfers not to increase (lower) the value of Ψ.
12 This propertyis called “rectiﬁance” in Kolm’s (1976a) seminal paper.
13 For any bistochastic n ×n-matrix B, that is a square matrix which contains only positive elements and which
columns and rows sum to one, a function is S-convex if Ψ(BX) 6 Ψ(X). If strict S-convexity is required, then we
should observe Ψ(BX) <Ψ(X) for all bistochastic matrices except permutations matrices.
14 Ebert (2004) stressed that invariance only deﬁnes relations between distributions for which we feel indifferent
with respect to inequality. So it is of no help for ranking distributionsthat are not in the same iso-inequality set.
15 An other justiﬁcation for the various invarianceaxioms presented here can be found in the normativeapproach
of inequality measurement. Since Kolm (1969); Atkinson (1970) and Sen (1973), inequality measures are often derived
from social evaluationfunctionsW :Dα →R which providea quasi-orderingof income distributionsfromthe set Dα.
In other words, W reﬂects the opinions of the social evaluator (the observer) in terms of distributivejustice. Let a and
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cently, Zheng (2004) has shed light on an axiom which is closely linked to invariance, namely the
unit-consistency axiom.16 Unit-consistency requires the inequality ordering to be invariant with
respect to changes in the common unit of measure adopted to evaluate the distributions. So we




∀X ∈ Dα where λ is a positive scalar and Λ is a continuous
monotone function from R+ to R+. In other words, two income distributions should be ranked in
the same manner according to Ψ when incomes are measured in euros or in dollars. As we will
see in the next sections, unit-consistency is necessary when considering inequality views that do
not rely on scale invariance.
Most of these axioms, even slightly modiﬁed, are shared by poverty measures. For instance,
continuity is generally replaced by restricted continuity such that Θ is a left continuous function
of x for all x < z. The main addition is the focus axiom which states that the only relevant in-
formation related to the non-poor members of the population is their number.17 So a poverty
measure Θ is not affected by any increment of the income of non-poor person. This explains why
povertymeasures are often considered as a restriction of inequality measures on the subset X p of
the income distribution such that each element of X p is not greater than the poverty line z. As a
consequence, the following expressions are perfect substitutes Θ(z,µ,π) = Θ(z,X) = Θ(z,X p,n).
An additional requirement is the weak monotonicity axiom which imposes on a poverty measure
not to decrease if a poor person’s income decreases. Finally, Θ should be non decreasing in z.18
In the following sections, we now details some particular versions of the invariance axiom
and present their implementation for the calculation of growth and inequality effects of poverty
variations.
2.1 Scale invariance
The most widely used invariance axiom is the scale invariance axiom, such that:
Ψ(λX)=Ψ(X) ∀λ>0. (2.2)
The scale invariance axiom means that doubling each income of the observed distribution
if the social evaluator’s preferences are in accordance with the “leftist” view. Applying the famous results of Arrow
and Pratt, Atkinson (1970) emphasizes that the ﬁrst two functional forms reﬂects a constant relative inequality (or
risk) aversion and the third one a constant absolute inequality (or risk) aversion. The function W is used to deﬁne
the equally distributed equivalent income ˜ x, that is the level of per capita income which, if equally distributed, would
provide the same level of social welfare as the observed distribution. Then the natural form of scale and translation





Ψa =µ− ˜ x.
According to Kolm (1976a), Ψr should be considered as a measure of inequality “per pound” and Ψa as a measure of
inequality “per person”.
16 This propertywas already detailed in Aczél and Moszner (1994). Kolm (1995) and Zoli (2003) also considered this
desired propertyand called it respectively “unit invariance”and “weak currency-independence”.
17 For mathematical convenience, a weak deﬁnition of poverty — an individual is poor if his income is strictly
inferior to the povertyline — is generally preferred (see for instanceDonaldson and Weymark, 1986).
18 If weputforwardthatΘ is strictlyincreasingin z, monotonicityis implicitly assumed. Formoredetails about the
different povertyaxioms and their interrelations, see Zheng (1997).
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does not affect inequality as measured by Ψ. In mathematical words, Ψ complies with scale in-
variance if it is homogeneous of degree zero.19 With the measurement of poverty, a markedly










which is less restrictive than the ﬁrst version since the sole condition imposed on the income of
the non-poor is to remain greater than z. Most inequality (e.g. Gini coefﬁcient, Atkinson index,
generalized entropy indexes) and poverty (e.g. Watts index, Sen index, Foster, Greer and Thor-
becke indexes) measures used in empirical analysis rely on these scale invariance axioms. The
same property holds for the traditional Lorenz curve. In the context of the decomposition of
poverty spells, scale invariance is often used in an implicit manner for the computation of the
intermediate values of the poverty measure since these one are generally deﬁned with respect to
the Lorenz curve.21 In the two period case, the respect of the scale invariance implies equations































µt .22 Extension to equations (1.5) and (1.6) is straightforward.23
Scale invariance is frequently seen as a desirable feature for an inequality measure so as its
value does not depend on the unit used for the measurement of incomes. Many authors like
Zheng (2004) argue that this is a rather strong requirement for an inequality or a povertymeasure
and that one only need the ranking of different distributions to be preserved when income are
expressed in a different measuring unit.2425 This unit-consistency axiom is weaker than scale
invariance since it allows for different way of thinking inequality while keeping the sole desirable
characteristic of scale invariance. So, if inequality is considered from an ordinal point of view,
19 In Kolm (1969), inequality measures that fulﬁlls scale invarianceare called “intensive”.
20 Mitra and Ok (1995) are dubious about the usefulness of invariance axiom in the context of poverty since it




with Θ(Xp,z). “Since the value of
a poverty index is explicitly a function of the poverty line, it does not make sense to compare the poverty levels of two
income distributions withe two different poverty lines.” We advocate that the knowledge of the properties of poverty
measures are essential when linking poverty to inequality. The nonsense would be to make use of inequality and
povertystudiesthatarenotbasedonthesameethicalground. Inthecontextofpovertyspellsdecompositionsbetween
growth and inequality components, our feeling is that the knowledge of the invariance axiom underlying the chosen
poverty measure is essential since it predetermines the relative contribution of growth and redistribution to poverty
reduction. Moreover, invariance properties of the poverty measures are crucial for relative poverty measures, that is
when the poverty line depends on the observed income distribution.
21 Most of the time, poverty measures respect a sole invariance axiom. So an explicit formulation of which invari-
ance axiom is used may be considered as secondary.
22 In the present section, we will assume n to be constant. Thus it can easily be dropped in order to save space.
However, results do not changewhen n varies throughtime.
23 In order to save space, we do not report the correspondingformula for the Shapley decomposition but use them
in the application developed in section 4.
24 The unit-consistency axiom is further analyzed for inequality and poverty measurement in Zheng (2007a, 2005,
2007b,c).
25 The argument that changes in the unit of measurement do not necessarily havethe same effects that changes of
size, was earlier presented by Aczél and Moszner (1994) in the more general context of economic indices.
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scale invariance is not the unique way of thinking inequality any more.
However, one should note that the scale invariance axiom may ﬁnd little support in presence
of negative incomes since it induces a failure of the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers.26 More-
over, ethical values associated with the measurement of inequality and poverty are not unani-
mously shared, even within welfare economists. In particular, there is no unanimous agreement
ontheinvarianceaxiomthatshould beused. Forinstance, Dalton(1920) arguedthatapplyingthe
same positive rate of growth to all income decreases the degree of inequality of the income dis-
tribution. Using questionnaires on samples of undergraduate students, Amiel and Cowell (1992;
1999; 2001) and Harrison and Seidl (1994b) observed that scale invariance was generally not sup-
ported for inequality analysis by a majority of the respondents and that many rival invariance
axioms were preferred by some respondents.27 A major implication of theses studies is that in-
equality measurement tools should reﬂect the heterogeneity of feelings and moral judgments
about inequality since one cannot discriminate between values without ethical, yet subjective,
arguments. As the design of poverty-reducing policies requires the use of tools thatare consistent
with policy makers’ ethical values, one should be cautious of a systematic use of indexes based
on the scale invariance axiom. Thus, we have to examine rival versions of the invariance axiom
and theirimplications forthe decomposition of povertyspells into growth andinequalitycompo-
nents.
2.2 Translation invariance
The ﬁrst rival invariance axiom that is commonly treated in the literature is the translation in-
variance axiom which, according to Kolm (1976a) is associated to a “leftist” view of inequality (in
Kolm’s words scale invariance corresponds to a “rightist” view). An inequality measure is said to
respect the translation invariance axiom if:
Ψ(X +δI)=Ψ(X) ∀δ∈R (2.6)
which implies that any equal increment or decrement of each income of the distribution leaves
the inequality index unchanged.2829 The less restrictive version of the translation invariance ax-
26 For instance, it may be difﬁcult to argue that the distributions X1 = {−2,20} and X2 = {−4,40} exhibit the same
degree of inequality. An acceptation of the statement Ψ(X1) =Ψ(X2) would imply a failure of the Pigou-Dalton trans-
fers principle. For instance a progressive transfer of 2 units would lead to the distribution X3 = {−2,38} such that
Ψ(X3)6 Ψ(X2). Therespectof both scaleinvarianceandtransfer principlewould lead tothehardly justiﬁableconclu-
sion that Ψ(X3)6 Ψ(X1). Zoli (2003) shows that the sole invariance axiom which is compatible with both S-convexity
and incomes deﬁned on R is the translation invariance axiom for n > 3, a result that was already observed by Kolm
(1976a) in the context of the “centrist” inequality view.
27 Primary interest of Amiel and Cowell (2001) is difference of inequality and risk perceptions, but the authors
choose to focus on invariance perceptions. Amiel and Cowell (1997) also performed an empirical investigation of
students’ agreement about axioms commonly used in the povertymeasurement related literaturebut did notexamine
compliance with invarianceaxioms.
28 For a detailed examination of inequality indices based on translation invariance, see Blackorby and Donaldson
(1980). However, we can mention the varianceas a widely used translation-invariantinequality measure. Other abso-
lute povertyindices are suggested in Mitra and Ok (1995) and Zheng (2007c).
29 Harrison and Seidl (1994a) argue that one can easily ﬁnd some inequality measure that is based on a combined
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iom that is suitable for poverty analysis is:
Θ
 







In this case, Θ should not be deﬁned any more with respect to the Lorenz curve. The counter-
part of the traditional Lorenz curve for translation invariant inequality measures is the absolute
Lorenz curve La (Moyes, 1987). Thus a translation invariant poverty measure can be written as
Θ(µ,La). Under this axiom, the estimation of the growth and inequality components of poverty
spells will differ from the one corresponding to scale invariant poverty measures.30 In the two





























where δt,t+k =µt+k −µt.
2.3 Intermediate invariance
The set of invariance axioms is not restricted to scale and translation invariances, and many ri-
val axioms, the so-called intermediate invariance axioms, have been developed during the last
decade. Intermediate views are based on the intuition that an equiproportional addition to all
incomes should increase inequality while an equal-increment to all incomes should reduce in-
equality. The ﬁrst reason of considering an intermediate view is of course that it may be the way
some people feel inequality should be deﬁned. In the context of poverty analysis, it will also be
useful to consider families of intermediate inequality views when the decompositions based on
scale and translation invariance do not yield the same conclusions. As in the context of inequal-
ity orderings, it may be wise to use intermediate inequality views so as to ﬁnd cut-off values of
the ethical parametersinvolved in the deﬁnition of each intermediate view such that conclusions
change when this particularvalue is crossed. Thus it can be seen as a way of assessing the robust-
ness of a conclusion obtained through scale or translation invariance.









Thisviewdiffers fromKolm; Kolm’s (1969; 1976b) “synthetic”solutionwhichsuggestsusinginequalitymeasuresthat
are scale invariant in their relative form and translation invariant in their absolute form (see note 15 for the deﬁnition
of the relativeand absolute forms).
For the sake of simplicity, we will suppose that the different invariance views are rival and thus should not be re-
spected simultaneously. Such an hypothesisis standardin therelated literaturebutwould merita furtherexamination
since empirical evidence shows that some individuals may feel in accordance with both scale and translation invari-
ance, a ﬁnding that most authors see as the results of mistakes (see for instanceAmiel and Cowell 1992).
30 Duclos and Wodon (2004) also considered translation invariance in the context of the social evaluation of “pro-
poor” character of growth, an issue that is closely linked to the decomposition of poverty spells into growth and in-
equality effects. However, theauthors did notinvestigatethe implications of a changein the chosen invarianceaxiom,
nor do they illustrate their approach with an empirical application.
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Kolm (1976a,b) was the ﬁrst to give a formal treatment to inequality indices based on an in-





=βΨ(X) ∀β>0, ε∈]−∞,0]. (2.10)
In these case, note that invariance is implicitly deﬁned since the transformed income distri-
bution of equation (2.10) is β times as unequal as the original distribution. Thus this inequality
view is poorly operational for the decomposition of poverty spells.
Inordertoavoidsuchanundesirablefeature,manyauthorsformulatedintermediateinequal-
ity views which explicitly deﬁnes the iso-inequality set of distributions that corresponds to any
distribution X. Before reviewing the various intermediate inequality views suggested in the lit-
erature, it may be useful to state precisely what is meant by intermediate inequality views. The
question is not trivial since the concept is given different meanings by authors of the ﬁeld. Gen-
erally, an inequality view is intermediate if an equiproportional increase in all incomes raises the
degree of income inequality, whereas an equal increment decreases it.32 In the present paper
we will consider classes of intermediate views with the help of a general parametrized deﬁnition
which states that the equally unequal income distributions ought to be expressed as weighted
means of the corresponding transformed distributions under scale and translation invariance.33
Hence, we suggest using a deﬁnition based on the following lemma:
Lemma 1. An inequalityviewis saidintermediateifthetransformeddistributionΦI(X,µY ) which


















with u(µX,µY )∈[0,1] ∀µY ∈R++.
Proof. Weknowthatwhateverthechoseninequalityview, everytransformedincomedistribution
Φ(X) is located on thetwo-dimension sub-space SX deﬁned bythevectors I and X. Onthe other
31 Intherelated literature,itiscommon tofocusoninvarianceaxioms thatareboundedby translationandscalein-
variance. Amiel and Cowell(1992) and Harrisonand Seidl (1994b) studies showthatthereis (little) supportforextreme
“rightist” — multiplying incomes by the same constant λ > 1 decreases inequality — and extreme “leftist” — adding
the same amount δ>0 to all incomes increases inequality — views. However, there is currently little formal treatment
of such views. An exception is the “ultra rightist” reference-point inequality view deﬁned by Ebert (2004). However, it
can be proved that this generalization of Bossert and Pﬁngsten (1990) is not unit-consistent.
32 In Bossertand Pﬁngsten’s (1990) and Zoli’s (2003) words, this propertyis respectively called “compromise condi-
tion” and “compromise inequality equivalence”.
33 An otherdeﬁnition, whichis derivedfromBossertand Pﬁngsten(1990) and Zheng(2007c,a), requirestheformu-
lation of an intermediateness axiom which implies that theintermediate inequality(poverty)orderingof twodistribu-
tions should be the same as theorderingcorrespondingto “leftist” and “rightist”views when their inequality(poverty)
orderingofthetwodistributionisidentical. Accordingtothisdeﬁnition,aninequality(poverty)indexisintermediateif
it respects the intermediateness axiom and includes some vectorof parameters such that scale invariantpovertymea-
sures and translation invariant inequality (poverty) measures are obtained for some limiting speciﬁc combinations of
these parameters. In fact, this parametrized deﬁnition does not deﬁne an intermediate view, but a class of interme-
diate views. Moreover, it is generally possible to extend the domain of the values of these parameters so as to include
extreme views.
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hand, the set of all income distributions with mean income equal to µY is on the hyperplane
deﬁned by the equation
 n
i=1 yi =nµY .
As this hyperplane is deﬁned by the normal vector I which is by deﬁnition included in the
subspace SX, its intersection with SX is non-empty and deﬁnes a unique ray L. By deﬁni-
tion, L passes through the distributions X
µY
µX , X + (µY −µX)I and IµY , and, more generally,
includes all distributions Φ(X,µY ) with mean income µY . Moreover, since it is a straight line,
every distribution Φ(X,µY ) can be expressed as a linear combination of the distributions X
µY
µX
and X +(µY −µX)I. It also deserves to be stressed that the closer a distribution Φ(X,µY ) is to the
distribution IµY , the more equal will it be considered.
Themost generaldeﬁnition of an intermediateinequality view is thatan inequalityview is in-
termediate when an equiproportional addition (subtraction) to all incomes increases (decreases)
inequality while an equal-increment (decrement) to all incomes reduces (increases) inequality.
Consequently, any distribution ΦI(X,µY ) derived from an intermediate inequality view is neces-
sarily located between the points X
µY
µX and X +(µY −µX)I on L. Thus, we can use the following











with u(µX,µY ) ∈ [0,1] ∀µY ∈ R++. Plugging equation (2.12) into equation 2.1 give a general deﬁ-
nition of intermediate invariance axioms through equation (2.11).
Inthecase oftheintermediateinvarianceaxiomsthatwill bereviewed inthenextparagraphs,
the weighing term u can be expressed as u(µX,µY ,ρ), ρ being some set of parameters. For some
combinations of these parameters, u(µX,µY ,ρ) = 1 (=0) and ΦI(X,ρ) becomes the equally un-
equal distribution with mean income µY corresponding to scale (translation) invariance. One
can also note that,for a given initial distribution X, u maydepend on thevalue of themean of the
ﬁnal distribution. In this case, u is not constant and the intermediateview may tend to “leftist” or
“rightist” views inequality as mean income increases.
Figures 1 illustrates this property of intermediate views in the case of a three-person distri-
bution X = {x1,x2,x3}. Perfect equality is represented by the straight line through the points O
and M. All distributions with mean equal to µY are on the plane deﬁned by the points A, B and
C. If incomes are non-negative, the set of distributions with mean equal to µY is restricted to the
surface ABC. All equally unequal distributions issued from distribution X are on the subspace




OM. The ray through the points X andO is the iso-inequality line
corresponding to scale invariance. It intersects the surface ABC at X S. The translation invari-
ance iso-inequality ray is the straight line through X and supported by
− − →
OM. The projection of
X according to this “leftist” view on the surface ABC is the point X T. It can be easily seen that
any transformation of X with mean µY is on the segment LM, that is the intersection of surface




OM.34 The point M is the one corresponding to an
equal distribution while L represents the most unequal distribution with mean µY that can be
34 Wedo notconsider thewholepartof thisintersectionsince pointsalong thelinethroughthepointsL and M but
closer to A than M are just permutationsof the income distributionsobserved on the segment LM.
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OM. Since by deﬁnition
any income distribution X I which is obtained through an intermediate transformation of X is
considered as more equal than X S and more unequal than X T when total income increases, X I
is necessarily on the segment X SX T and can be expressed as a linear combination of the vectors
− − − →
OX S and
− − − →
OX T.
Figure 1: “Leftist”,“rightist and intermediate equally unequal income distributions.
2.3.1 Linear intermediate invariance
As an alternative to the “centrist” view of Kolm, Bossert and Pﬁngsten (1990) suggest an interme-












where η∈[0,1] reﬂects ethical preferences.35 Ebert (1997) notices that income should be deﬁned
on Dα so that α = −
1−η
η . He also demonstrates that the respect of the Pigou-Dalton principle of
transfers imposes the condition ϕ>−1/η. So as to ease the interpretation of the parameter ϕ, we
35 Ebert (2004) suggests that the parameter η of equation (2.13) can be deﬁned on the range R+ in order to extend
intermediate inequality to “ultra-rightist” views of inequality. For η > 1, incomes have to be greater than α > 0 which
represents the level of income needed for thesatisfactionof basic needs. This “ultra-rightist”view of Ebert (2004), also
called “reference point” inequality, implies that each additional income has to be distributed in proportion of each
individual disposable income, that is the difference between the actual income and α, in order to preserve the degree
of inequality. This view was also expressed but not formalized in Dalton (1920).
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where Y is the transformed distribution. If we intend to transform the distribution X in order to
get an income distribution with mean µY without changing inequality, equation (2.14) implies
ϕ=
µY −µX






to behave like a “rightist” transformation as mean income increases when η>0. This can be seen
from equation (2.15) since limµX→+∞ u(µX,η)=1 ∀η>0.
Using the intermediate invariance axiom deﬁned by equation (2.13) and a given value of η

























































η(µt−1)+1. However, Zheng(2004) demonstratedthatanyinequalitymeasurebased
on the view developed by Bossert and Pﬁngsten (1990) violates unit-consistency. Thus, it should
not be used for the measurement of inequality and poverty since it may lead to non-robust con-
clusions.
In order to get a linear family of transformations that do not tend to behave like the “rightist”
view, Pﬁngsten and Seidl (1997) have proposed the so-called ray-invariance axiom. An inequal-
ity view respects a ray-invariance axiom if equally unequal distributions are along a ray which
includes the observed income distribution. This ray is deﬁned by a vector drawn from the n-
simplex and which has to respect the following conditions: i) the vector Lorenz-dominates the




.36 This view differs
from the one described through equation (2.13) inasmuch as the part of the incremental income
that is not equally shared between each income receivers, is not necessarily distributed in pro-
portion of each income’s share in the initial distribution. Ethical preferences are then described
through a n-vector that unfortunately cannot be easily interpreted.37 A particular case of Pﬁng-
36 A general expression of ray-invariance was also provided by Krtscha (1994) under the name of “weak relative
inequality”. The authorargued that this is not a suitable way of thinkinginequality since there is no reason that a large
additional amount should be shared in the same manner that a smaller one.
37 Moreover, Zoli (2003) observes that individuals with the same level of income may receive a different amount. A
different treatment of identical income-receivers can be seen as a violation of the anonymity axiom. The same remark
seems to hold for the inequality view deﬁned through equation (2.19). However, conditions imposed on V in Alonso-
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sten and Seidl(1997) ray-invariance is the(V,υ)-invariance described bydelRio and Ruiz-Castillo
(2000) and generalized by Alonso-Villar and del Rio (2007a), which imposes the use of a reference


















where υ ∈ [0,ι] reﬂects ethical preferences and VX is the projection of the reference distribution
V into the subspace SX deﬁned by the vectors X and I. For υ = 0, the “leftist” inequality view is
obtained whereas υ=ι corresponds to the “rightist” view.38 In appendix A, we demonstrate thata
































In order to simplify we can chose X as the reference distribution. In this case, the link with
equation (2.11) is straightforward since u(µX,µY ,ρ)= υ.39 With any other regular distribution V,
it can easily be proved that lemma 1 still holds under certain conditions (cf. appendix B).40
Contrary to Bossert and Pﬁngsten’s (1990) intermediate view, one should note that the value
of the parameter υ is contingent to the choice of a reference distribution. If we consider two dis-
tributions X andY with differentmeans, onecaneasily demonstratethatthetransformationofY
into X using Y as the reference will require a value υ′ that is differentfrom the one corresponding
to a transformation of X into Y using X as the reference except for υ=1 and υ=0. Otherwise, we
observe (del Rio and Ruiz-Castillo, 2000, proposition 1) υ′ =
υµY
(1−υ)µX+υµY .41
Villar and del Rio (2007a) ensureanonymity to be respected (see note 40).
38 In del Rio and Ruiz-Castillo (2000) and Alonso-Villar and del Rio (2007a), the parameter υ is deﬁned on the unit
interval. However, for any distribution X, it can be shown that υ=1 corresponds to an “ultra-rightist”view until VX is
equal to X up to a scale factor.
39 Zheng(2004, proposition2.4)arguedthatinequalitymeasuresbasedonPﬁngstenandSeidl(1997)tendtobehave
like translation invariant measures as mean income increases when υ < 1. Our result that u(µX ,µY ,ρ) is constant
invalidates these proposition.
40 InAlonso-VillaranddelRio(2007a), ray-invariantinequalityviewsarecharacterizedbysubstitutingthereference













between the chosen vector of increments
υ V
µV +(1−υ)I and the one correspondingto equal increments I
n. The vector (χ,υ) deﬁnes a uniqueintermediate view
since a unique vector υ V
µV +(1−υ)I is associated with each two-dimension subspace for given values of χ and υ. This
view implicitlyintroducesanew(andmaybecontroversial)axiomforthemeasurement ofinequalitythatsuggeststhat
two distributionswith the same mean are equally unequal if their size-normalized Euclidean distance from the vector
of perfect equality is the same.
In practice, such a generalization of del Rio and Ruiz-Castillo’s (2000) view will be helpful to compare the different
values of υ when the decomposition of povertyspells is realized for many subperiods (cf. appendix A).





152 INVARIANCE AND THE DECOMPOSITION OF POVERTY VARIATIONS




























X is the bottom part of VX so that X p and V
p
X are of the same size, and VX,b is the b-th
element ofVX so thatVX,b−1 6 z <VX,b. The parameterτ is restricted in the same way as in equa-












































withτt,t+k =µt+k−µt andVt andVt+k beingtherespectiveprojectionsofV inthetwo-dimension
subspacesincluding Xt and Xt+k anddeﬁnedthroughequation2.20.42 Itcaneasilybeproventhat
del Rio and Ruiz-Castillo’s (2000) inequality view complies with unit-consistency (cf. appendix C)
and so is suitable for poverty analysis.4344
However, a major issue with equations (2.23) and (2.24) is that the decomposition of poverty
variationsmaynotprovidetheresultscorrespondingtoscaleinvarianceinamultiperiodanalysis.
As the value of theparameterι varywith from a distribution to an other, we haveto adoptits min-
imal value for all comparisons in order to avoid “ultra-rightist” views. When using this particular
valueι∗, wewillthenobtainintermediatedecompositions forsomeperiodsand“rightist”decom-
positions for the periods which initial or ﬁnal distribution is the one that deﬁnes ι∗. This result is
puzzling since it would be a non-sense to compare on the basis of the same (V,ι∗)-intermediate
view intermediate effects for a period with “rightist” effects for other periods. Consequently, we
argue that the view developed by del Rio and Ruiz-Castillo (2000) is not suitable for poverty anal-
ysis.
Moreover, linear intermediateinvarianceaxioms maynot beanappropriatewayofmodelling
individual’ tastes and feelings. Amiel and Cowell (2001) results suggest that many people may
It can be easily shown that υ′ >υ if µY >µX.






















From a practical point of view, it may be easier to use equation (2.24), since observed distributions Xt and Xt+k are
not necessarily of the same size.
43 An alternativeway of proving unit-consistency(Alonso-Villar and del Rio, 2007a) is to deﬁne an inequality mea-
sure based on the expressed inequality view and which respects basic inequality axioms and then to demonstrate that
the measure is unit-consistent.
44 Zheng (2007a) recently demonstrates that the sole unit-consistent intermediate inequality view which Lorenz-
criterion can be expressed as a quasilinear weighted mean of the relative and absolute Lorenz curves is the non-linear
inequalityviewproposedbyKrtscha(1994) andYoshida(2005). Thisresultisconsistentwithourﬁndingssinceonecan
prove that the intermediate Lorenz curve corresponding to del Rio and Ruiz-Castillo’s (2000) view is not intermediate
in the sense of Zheng (2007a) and thus can generally not be expressed as a quasilinear weighted mean of the relative
and absolute Lorenz curves.
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think inequality in a way that involves non-linear invariance axioms. Such views are presented in
the next section.
2.3.2 Non-linear intermediate invariance
In the preceding section, we considered inequality views such that distributions that are consid-
ered as equivalent to distribution X from an inequality point of view, are aligned on a unique ray
through X. In the present section we focuson non-linear intermediateviews. Thedifference with
linear intermediate views is that thecomplete sequence of equally unequaldistributions of size n
deﬁnes a curve through X.45
Recently, Zoli (2003) and Yoshida (2005) developed some non-linear intermediate view of
inequality that do not break with basic desirable properties like the linear transformations pre-














(X −µI)+ωµI ∈D+ (2.25)
where σ and κ are ethical preference parameters respectively deﬁned on the unit interval and on
R+. For σ = 1, we get equation (2.13) with κ =
1−η





µ +1. Bossert and Pﬁngsten
(1990) intermediate inequality is a particularcase of Zoli (2003) non-linear inequality view. In the
spirit of Krtscha’s (1994) fair compromise inequality view, a single-parameter version of this gen-
eral invariance axiom, the σ-invariance axiom, is suggested by Yoshida (2005) with κ = 0. Zheng
(2007a) demonstrates that Zoli (2003)’s “ﬂexible inequality equivalence” can be used to deﬁne in-
equality measures that respect the unit-consistency axiom only if κ = 0. Thus, we only focus in









As for the preceding intermediate inequality views, it can be useful to express the equally
unequal income vector with mean µY and corresponding to distribution X using equation (2.11).
45 Hagenaars (1987) was apparently the ﬁrst to deﬁne a poverty measure that does not comply with scale or trans-





logz where q is the length of the vector Xp, implicitly
relies on the following non-linear intermediate invarianceaxiom:
Ψ(Xν)=Ψ(X) ∀ν∈R++, X ∈D1.
which corresponds to an ultra-rightistview for any positiverate of growth (xj >1∀j and ν>1). This inequality view is
considered byEbert(2004) asnon-coherentsincea sequenceofa progressivetransferandanincreaseinmean income
thatdoes notchangethedegreeofinequality, does notyield thesamedistributionas theconversesequence. However,
we can question if this “transfer-consistency”axiom is really desirable.
On the other hand, it should be stressed that this inequality view is not suitable for poverty and inequality measure-
ment since unit-consistency is not respected for all λ ∈ R++. For instance if ΘH(X,z) > ΘH(Y,z), H(λX,λz) will be
greater that H(λY,λz) if and only if λ > 1





. Moreover, it seems that
no ultra-rightist inequality or poverty measure can comply with unit-invariance. In fact, ultra-rightist views require
incomes tobedeﬁned onthesetDα ⊂D++. Sincetherealwaysexist somestrictlypositivescalar λsuch thatλX ∉Dα,
unit-consistencycannot be respected.
46 Zoli (2003) also considered this special case and called it “proportionalinequality equivalence”.
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income should be divided into inﬁnitesimal amounts that are sequentially shared such that 100σ
percent are distributed in proportion of the income relative shares and 100(1−σ) percent equally
among income receivers. Alonso-Villar and del Rio (2007b) note that for σ > 0, this inequality
view tends to behave like a “leftist” view as the initial mean income increases. Here, we would
like to stress that this statement depends on the assumption made about the relation between
µX and µY . If we consider a constant difference between the initial and ﬁnal mean incomes, we
have to recognize that limµX→+∞ u(µX,µY ,σ)= 0 ∀σ < 1. On the other hand, for a given positive
growth rate g =
µY −µX
µX , it can be seen from equation (2.27) that limµX→+∞ u(µX,µY ,σ)=
(1+g)σ−1
g
∀σ.47 In other words, the σ-invariance axiom keeps being intermediate if we consider constant
growth rates. It can also be seen from equation 2.27 that the value of σ such thatthe intermediate
counterfactual distribution is the arithmetic mean or the counterfactual “leftist” and “rightist”













≃ 0.5 in most cases. For instance if mean
income increases by 10% over the period of interest, the value of ˜ σ is approximately equal to 0.51.
Thus, even if we compare the results of intermediate decompositions over many periods with
different growth rates, it is reasonable to accept the same value of σ for each period as standing
for the same intermediate inequality view.




























































3 Invariance, the measurement of poverty and the decomposition of
its variations
3.1 The headcount index
Most poverty indexes respect a unique invariance axiom. As a consequence there is no uncer-
tainty about the invariance axiom that should be adopted for the decomposition of variations
47 An interesting feature is that the value of u(µX ,µY ,σ) does not depend of the monetary unit chosen for the
measurement of incomes. Consequently, for a given value of σ, we will get the same growth and inequality effects if
incomes are measured in dollars or in thousand dollars.
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of such measures. However it can be easily shown that the most widely used poverty index, the
headcount index, is the sole measure that is consistent with all the invariance axioms presented
through the preceding lines.





where Ξ isa function returningthelength of thespeciﬁed vector. A particularfeatureofthe head-
count index among the traditional poverty measures is presented in the following proposition:
Proposition 1. Continuous increasing functions of the headcount index are the sole poverty mea-
sures that respect both scale, translationand intermediate invariance axioms.
Proof. In the ﬁrst paragraphs of section 2, an invariance axiom is given a general deﬁnition with
the help of a continuous increasing function Φ on Dα. This precludes the use of extreme “left-
ist” views, since the class of functions Φ ought to be restricted to rank preserving functions. So
whatever the speciﬁc form of Φ, we should observe Φ(xp) 6 Φ(z) 6 Φ(xp+1) for xp 6 z 6 xp+1,









= h(z,X). We can conclude that the headcount index complies with all invari-
ance axioms which imply transformations of incomes that are included between those induced
by scale and translation invariance axioms.
To prove that the headcount is the sole traditional poverty measure that is compatible with
the various invariance axioms presented earlier, we can make use of the results of Zheng (1994,
proposition 2) which states that the sole povertymeasures that respect both scale and translation
invarianceaxiomsaretheheadcount-relatedpovertyindexes,i.e. povertyindexesthataredeﬁned
as continuous increasing functions of the size of the distribution and the number of poor.48
Proposition 1 means thatthe decomposition of variations of the headcount index into growth
and inequality components can be handled in many ways. So, the couple of equations (2.4,2.5),
(2.8,2.9), (2.17,2.18), (2.23,2.24) and (2.29,2.30) are all consistent with the axiomatic of the head-
count index. The choice of a particular decomposition framework relies entirely on individual
perceptions and tastes about inequality. However, for reasons that have been already detailled
in the preceding lines, we argue that researchers should make use of the sole “rightist”, “leftist”
and non-linear intermediate decompositions, and then use the sole couple of equations(2.4,2.5),
(2.8,2.9) and (2.29,2.30).
3.2 Implications for the decompositionof poverty variations
In the following paragraphs, we try to sketch the consequences on the estimated growth and in-
equality effects of a move from a “rightist” to a “leftist” view. It can easily be shown that we do not
48 According to Zheng (1994) a less restrictivedeﬁnition of the family of headcount-related poverty indexes can be
adopted if we do not impose the respect of the population, weak monotonicityand subgroup consistency axioms.
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need to consider explicitly intermediate invariance to deﬁne an ordering of “leftist”, intermedi-
ate and “rightist” effects since the ﬁrst and the last deﬁnes the range of the second. This result is
summarized in proposition 2.
Proposition 2. The value of any intermediate growth (inequality) effect of observed variations of
the headcount index is always comprised between the values of the “leftist” and “rightist” growth
(inequality) effects.
Proof. Thedemonstrationisadirectimplicationoflemma1. Astheintermediateequallyunequal
distributions ΦI(X,µY ) are weighted mean of the “leftist” an “rightist” counterfactual distribu-
tions X
µY
µX and X +(µY −µX)I, itscumulative distribution function(CDF)is bounded between the
CDFs of X
µY
µX and X +(µY −µX)I. As a result, the effects obtained through the equations (1.3) to
(1.6) under scale and translation invariance are bounds for the effects obtained through interme-
diate invariance axioms.
Figure2illustrates thisproposition in thecase of athree-person(or three-group)distribution.
Thetriangle ABC isthesameasinﬁgure 1butcan bereducedto asimplex forthesakeofsimplic-
ity. In this case, the distance of point with respect to the points A, B andC respectively indicates






3 are the projec-
tions of the poverty line z for each individual along the axis AB, BC and AC (see ﬁgure 2). Then,
the poverty status of each member of the population depends of the position of the distribution






3 . In this example, we consider that µY is larger than
z. Then theﬁrst individual fall into povertyif thepoint distribution is on the rightof the line zB
1 zC
1
and non-poor otherwise. If X T and X S are the corresponding equally unequal distributions to
X with mean µY , we know that every intermediate distribution ΦI(X,µY ) will be located on the
segment X T X S. Points X I, X I′
and X I′′
are potential counterfactual distributions corresponding
to intermediate transformations of X. Whatever the location of ΦI(X,µY ), we can see that the











Figure2: Invariance and poverty variations in the three-person simplex.
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3.2.1 “Leftist” vs “Rightist” growth effects
In thefollowing paragraphs, we show thatthe computationof the growth and inequalityeffectsof
variationsoftheheadcountindexundereachinvarianceaxiomaremostofthetimenotnecessary
if one just intend tocompare themagnitudeof theeffects. Proposition 3statesthatamove froma
“rightist” toamore “leftist”inequality view isnotlikely tochangethesign oftheestimatedgrowth
effect.
Proposition 3. Whatever invariance axiom is considered, the sign of the growth effect is the same
as the observed growth rate.
Proof. The proposition is just the result of the application of the weak monotonicity axiom when
every income xi is increased.
It deserves to be emphasized that when continuous distributions of income are considered
and the probability of observing an income equal to z is non zero, the growth effect is always
different from zero.49
Proposition 4. In the context of the Datt and Ravallion (1992) decomposition of the headcount
index, the “leftist” growth effect is lower than the “rightist”growth effect if and only if the observed
growth rate is positive (negative) and the ﬁnal mean income is above (below) the poverty line.
Proof. Using the Datt and Ravallion (1992) approach, the relation between the different growth
effects uniquely depends on the sign of the observed rate of growth and the relative position of
theﬁnalmeanincome andthepovertyline. Thus, we havetoconsider thefollowing differentfour
cases situations:
i) Let’sconsider ﬁrstthemost common case ofapositive rateofgrowth (µY >µX)andµY > z,
with X and Y being respectively the initial and ﬁnal income distributions. If mean incomes are
higher thanthepovertyline, poor individuals gain less from “pure”growth underscale invariance
than under translation invariance, i.e.:




If µX < z, then:
 
xj +(µY −µX)> xj
µY
µX ∀j ∈{1,...s|xs−1 <µX 6 xs},
xj +(µY −µX)< xj
µY
µX ∀j ∈{s +1,...p|xs−1 <µX 6 xs}.
(3.3)
In this last case, we are only interested in individuals which rank are in the set {1,...s|xs−1 <µX 6
xs} since all the other poor individuals become non-poor when their income are increased by
















49 An analytical demonstration for marginal changes of mean income using scale invariance can be found in Kak-
wani (1993).
213 INVARIANCE,THE MEASUREMENT OF POVERTY AND THE DECOMPOSITION OF ITS VARIATIONS
ii) On the other hand if the growth rate is negative (µY < µX), we have to consider the evolu-
tion of non-poor income, or more precisely the income of the non-poor that would become poor
after the “pure” growth effect. The comparison of these counterfactual incomes with scale and
translation invariance yields:
 
xj +(µY −µX)6 xj
µY
µX ∀j ∈{p,...s|xs−1 <µX 6 xs},
xj +(µY −µX)> xj
µY
µX ∀j ∈{s +1,...n|xs−1 <µX 6 xs}.
(3.4)
since z < µY < µX. As individuals from the set {s +1,...n|xs−1 <µX 6 xs} do not cross the poverty











and conclude GT >GS.
iii) For a positive rate of growth but µY < z, the income of the poor individuals increase ac-
cording to equation (3.3). This time, only individuals which rank is in the set {s +1,...p|xs−1 <












iv) Considering the last situation of a negative growth rate with µY < z, we know that income
of the non-poor become:
xj +(µY −µX)> xj
µY
µX
∀j ∈{p +1,...n}. (3.5)
if µX < z and:
 
xj +(µY −µX)6 xj
µY
µX ∀j ∈{p,...s|xs−1 <µX 6 xs},
xj +(µY −µX)> xj
µY
µX ∀j ∈{s +1,...n|xs−1 <µX 6 xs}.
(3.6)
otherwise. In the second case, all members from the set {p,...s|xs−1 < µX 6 xs} become poor
whatever invariance axiom is considered. Thus results differ only with respect to the evolution












Figure 3 gives some insight about the rationale underlying proposition 4 for a two-person (or
two-group) distribution and a positive rate of growth.50 Starting from the point X with coordi-
nates (x1,x2), the equally unequal distributions corresponding to scale and translation invari-
ance are respectively represented by the lines X X S and X X T. For a ﬁnal distribution with mean
income µY , the corresponding counterfactual incomes can be found at the points where each of
these curvescross the line X SX T which represents the set of income distributions with mean µY .




2 ). If the poverty line is set to z < µY ,
only one individual is considered as poor in the initial distribution. Whereas the scale invariance
transformation of incomes does not change the value of the headcount index (the ﬁrst individual
is still poor), the sharingoutof theadditionalincome undertranslation invariancelowers poverty
50 The case of negative growth rate can be easily derived from ﬁgure 4 if distribution Y (point E) is chosen as the
initial distribution.
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since nobody is considered as poor anymore. Consequently, we observes GT < GS = 0. On the
other hand, if the poverty line is set to z′ > µY , the results are reversed. The initial distribution
presents à 100% povertyrate which does not change with a translation invariance transformation
of incomes by is halved using the scale invariance axiom. Thus, we observeGS <GT =0.
Figure3: “Leftist” vs “rightist” growth effects with a positive rate of growth.
Most of the time, the Shapley decomposition provides the same ordering of the “leftist” and
“rightist” growth effects as the Datt and Ravallion (1992) decomposition. This result and its ex-
ceptions are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 5. The Shapley decomposition technique yields the same ordering of the “leftist” and
“rightist”growtheffectsthantheDattandRavallion(1992) decompositionexcept ifthepovertyline



















z,Y +(µX −µY )I
 
. (3.7)
Proof. The extension of proposition 4 to the Shapleydecomposition is straightforward and yields
the same result except whenthe povertyline lies between themeanincome of the initialandﬁnal
distributions. These two particular cases are:
i) If µY > z >µX, the difference between “rightist” and “leftist” counterfactualincomes of the











On the other hand, the counterfactual incomes of the non-poor in distribution Y are ranked as
follows:  
yj +(µX −µY )6 yj
µX
µY ∀j ∈{q,...r|yr−1 <µY 6 yr},
yj +(µX −µY )> yj
µX
µY ∀j ∈{r +1,...n|yr−1 <µY 6 yr}.
(3.8)
with q =Ξ(Y |yi < z). Since the income of allmembersof theset {q,...r|yr−1 <µY 6 yr} fallbelow
the poverty line, only the second line of equation (3.8) can be considered. As a consequence,
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ii) Considering the situation with µX > z >µY , the income of the non-poor individual in dis-











is negative, we have to focus on the evolution of the income of the poor in distribution Y . These
counterfactual incomes exhibit the following relation:
 
yj +(µX −µY )> yj
µX
µY ∀j ∈{1,...r|yr−1 <µY 6 yr},
yj +(µX −µY )< yj
µX
µY ∀j ∈{r +1,...q|yr−1 <µY 6 yr}.
(3.9)
As every individual j ∈ {r +1,...q|yr−1 < µY 6 yr} is not poor anymore whatever invariance ax-
iom is considered, only members from the set {1,...r|yr−1 < µY 6 yr} matter. We conclude that
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are computed. ForG′T >G′S, rearrangingthesecond
term of equation (3.10) yields equation (3.7).
For convenience, the combined results of propositions 3, 4 and 5 are summarized in table 1.
Table 1: Comparison of the growth effects under scale and translation invariance.
Condition Decomposition technique
Growth Poverty line Datt and Ravallion (1992) Shapley
µY >µX µY > z GT 6GS 60 G′T 6G′S 60
ora G′S 6G′T 60
µY >µX µY < z GS 6GT 60 G′S 6G′T 60
µX >µY µY > z GT >GS >0 G′T >G′S >0
µX >µY µY < z GS >GT >0 G′S >G′T >0
orb G′T >G′S >0
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In most cases, the value of the poverty line is below those of the initial and ﬁnal mean in-
come. As a consequence, we should expect the “leftist” growth effect to be inferior (superior) to
the “rightist” growth effect for positive (negative) observed growth rates.
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3.2.2 “Leftist” vs “Rightist” inequality effects
Now, we turn to the “leftist” and “rightist” inequality effects of headcount index variations. Con-
trary to growth effects, the sign of these inequality effects cannot be derived neither from the
sole comparison of the poverty line and the initial and ﬁnal mean incomes, nor from the use
of inequality measures. For instance, a decrease in inequality according to any scale invariant
inequality measure, do not necessarily implies that the corresponding inequality effect is nega-
tive.51 Moreover, no Lorenz dominance criterion can be used for the purpose of headcount index
comparisons. In the context of the Datt and Ravallion (1992) decomposition framework, the sole
ordering criterion that may be helpful is the ﬁrst-degree stochastic dominance condition (Atkin-
son, 1987) between the initial distribution and the counterfactual distribution derived from the
ﬁnaldistribution. Inotherwords, theonlywayofgettingthesign ofD, whateverinvarianceaxiom
is chosen, is to compute its value.
Proposition 6. Using the Datt and Ravallion (1992) decomposition of the headcount index, the
“leftist” inequality effect is larger than the “rightist” inequality effect if and only if the observed
growth rate is positive (negative) and the initialmean income is above (below) the poverty line.
Proof. As for the comparison of the different growth effects using the Datt and Ravallion (1992)
decomposition framework, the ordering of the “leftist” and “rightist” growth effects only depends
on the sign of the growth rate and the relative position of µX and z. Consequently, the four fol-
lowing cases must be separately treated:
i) Suppose ﬁrst that µY > µX and µX > z. For the computation of the inequality effect using
the Datt and Ravallion (1992) decomposition technique, the focus ought to be put on the trans-
formation of non-poor individuals income from distribution Y in the context of a positive rate of
growth. The comparison of the transformed incomes is given by equation (3.8). Since only non-
poor individuals whose incomes are lower than µY are susceptible to cross the poverty line, we
are only interested in the ﬁrst line of equation (3.8). As a result, h
 









and then DT >DS.
ii) Foranegativegrowth ratebutµX still largerthat z, we havetoconsider twodifferentcases,
depending on the relative position of µY and z. If µY > z, the comparison of the counterfactual
incomes is given by:




On the other hand, if µY < z, the ranking is given by equation (3.9). Since all members from the
set {r +1,...q|yr−1 < µY 6 yr} cross the poverty line, only the very poorest will make the differ-
ence for the comparison of the “leftist” and “rightist” effects. In both situations, we thus ﬁnd
h
 








and conclude DT 6DS.
iii) Considering the situation of a positive growth rate and µX < z, the value of the inequality
effects depends on the way non-poor income in distribution Y change. Two different cases can
be met. WithµY > z, thesituationisdescribed byequation(3.8). Since theincome ofallmembers
51 Bresson (2007) shows in the context of the analytical derivation of a class of inequality elasticities of poverty
that an increase in inequality may just as well result in an increase or a decrease of the level of poverty whatever the
respective position of mean income and the povertyline.
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of the set {q,...r|yr−1 <µY 6 yr} fall below the poverty line, only the second line of equation (3.8)
can be considered.
Assuming µY < z gives:




In both situations, h
 








and we ﬁnd Dt 6DS.
iv) Finally, for a negative growth rate and µX < z, the ordering of poor individual incomes
is given by equation (3.9). As only those from the set {r +1,...q|yr−1 < µY 6 yr} may cross the
poverty line, we ﬁnd h
 








and conclude Dt >DS.
Figure 4 is the counterpart of ﬁgure 3 for the computation of the inequality effects using the
Datt and Ravallion (1992) decomposition framework. In this case, the ﬁnal distribution Y is re-
ported as it is needed to ﬁnd the corresponding equally unequal distributions with mean income
µX. In order to improve the readability of the ﬁgure, the coordinates (y1,y2) are permuted, but
this modiﬁcation is of no consequence for our purpose. If the poverty line is set to z, both indi-
viduals are considered as poor in the original distribution (point X). With scale invariance, the
counterfactual distribution Y S which exhibit the same degree of inequality as Y does not change
thevalueofthepovertyindexsinceeveryincomeremainsbelow thepovertyline. Onthecontrary,
the translation invariance transformation Y T of distribution Y yields a counterfactual distribu-
tion with only half of the population being poor since yT
2 > z > yT
1 . Thus, we ﬁnd DT < DS = 0.
On the other hand, with a poverty line z′ that is larger than the initial mean income, the initial
value of the headcount index is zero and does not change if we adopt a “rightist” view. With the
“leftist” inequality view, the number of poor increases as the ﬁrst individual income falls below
the poverty line. As a consequence, we conclude DT >DS =0.
Proposition 7. With the Shapley decomposition of the headcount index, the “leftist” inequality
effect is higher than the “rightist”inequality effect if and only if the observed growth rate is positive
(negative) andthe ﬁnalmean incomeis above (below)thepovertyline, except ifthepoverty linelies



















z,Y +(µX −µY )I
 
. (3.13)
Proof. In the case of the Shapley decomposition, the demonstration is trivial since we know that
D′ =∆h−G′. As∆h remainsthesamewhateverinvarianceaxiomhasbeenadopted, thedifference
between D′S and D′T is simply the opposite of the difference betweenG′S andG′T.
A noticeable featureof propositions 6and 7 is thatthe orderingof the inequality effectsunder
scale and translation invariance does not depend of the sign of these effects. Generally the value
of the povertyline is below the observedmean values of the initial andﬁnalincome distributions.
In this situation, we should expect the “leftist” inequality effect to be superior (inferior) to the
“rightist” inequality effect for positive (negative) observed growth rates. Considering the relative
contributionofgrowth andredistributionto variationsoftheheadcount,moving froma“rightist”
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Note: in order to improve the readability of the ﬁgure, in-
comes of the two individuals are permuted with respect to
distribution X.
Figure 4: “Leftist” vs “rightist”inequality effects with a positive rate of growth.
Table 2: Comparison of the inequality effects under scale and translation invariance.
Condition Decomposition technique
Growth Poverty line Datt and Ravallion (1992) Shapley
µY >µX µX > z DT >DS D′T >D′S
µY >µX µX < z DT 6DS D′T 6D′S
ora D′T >D′S
µX >µY µX > z DT 6DS D′T 6D′S
orb D′T >D′S
µX >µY µX < z DT >DS D′T >D′S
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to a “leftist” inequality view increases the contribution of growth to the reduction of poverty with
respect to redistribution for a positive rate of growth.
This result has major implications for the evaluation of “pro-poor” growth. If growth is said
“pro-poor” when observed povertyreduction is higher thatthe reduction thatwould occur under
distribution neutrality (Kakwani and Pernia, 2000), leaving scale invariance for intermediate and
“leftist” inequality views makes generally the occurrence of “pro-poor” growth more scarce when
mean income increases. At the other hand, negative growth is more likely to be deemed “pro-
poor” under the translation invariance axiom than under the scale invariance axiom.
4 An applicationto poverty in China, 1990-2004
Most of thetime, empiricalstudiesrelatedtoincome inequalityandpovertyare(implicitly) based
on the prior that inequality and poverty should be analyzed through scale invariant tools. This
may reﬂect the mainstream view in economics but not necessarily the dominant view of policy-
makers and citizens. As stated earlier, the heterogeneity of inequality perceptions is a relevant
justiﬁcation foranalyzing thesensibility of resultsto ethicalpreferencesin povertystudies.52 Em-
pirical studies that do not rely on scale invariance are scarce. Such studies include del Rio and
Ruiz-Castillo (2001) on the evolution of inequality in Spain from 1980 to 1991 and Atkinson and
Brandolini (2004) on international and global income inequalities in the last century.
In the present section, we want to illustrate the importance of a choice of a particular axiom
for the decomposition of poverty variations into growth and inequality components using Chi-
nese data. Considering China is of prime importance: recent publications (Bhalla, 2004; Sala-i
Martin, 2004, 2006) related to the evolution of the world income distribution have stressed how
theirresultsweresensitivetochangesintheChinesedistribution. Moreovermanyauthors(Besley
and Burgess, 2003; Chen and Ravallion, 2004) have emphasized the crucial role of China in the
achievementoftheglobalobjective ofhalvingextremepovertyduringtheperiod1990-2015. Such
an important contribution to global poverty reduction is generally attributed to the impressive
economic performances of China during the last decade (Chen and Ravallion, 2007). In the fol-
lowingparagraphs, weemphasizethatthisconclusioniscontingenttoaxiomaticchoicesandmay
not hold when moving from a “rightist” to a “leftist” view.
4.1 Data
The data used in this paper stem from the 1990, 1996, 1999 and 2003 rounds of the China Health
andNutritionSurvey(CHNS).TheCHNSisanongoinglongitudinalsurveythatcoversnineprovinces
(Guangxi, Guizhou, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu, Liaoning, Heilongjiang and Shangdong). Al-
though the survey is not nationally representative, these provinces were selected to provide sig-
niﬁcant variability in geography, economic development and health indicators, so that they may
be considered to be roughly representative of the whole population of the country.
52 One should have in mind that the use of different measures like the Theil and the Gini coefﬁcient in a given
empirical study also implies axiomatic changes and so involvesa mix of different ethical preferences.
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A multistage random-cluster sampling procedure was used to draw the sample from each of
the provinces. Counties in the eight provinces were stratiﬁed by income (low-, middle- and high-
income groups) with per capita income ﬁgures from the State Statistical Ofﬁce, and a weighted
sampling scheme was used to select four counties randomly in each province (one low income,
two middle income, andone highincome). A probability-proportional-to-size samplingwasthen
chosen to select the sample from these units. In addition, urban areas that were initially not
within the county-strata were later incorporated by including the provincial capital and a low-
income city from each province. Within each county, the township capital was added and three
villages were chosen randomly. Within each city, urban and sub-urban neighborhoods were ran-
domly picked out. The same random selection procedure was used to choose the neighborhoods
for townships and villages.
Income data are divided between incomes issued from agriculture, business, paid activities,
subventions and remittances. The agricultural incomes come from ﬁshing, farming, crops grow-
ing, gardeningandrearing. Business incomes arerelatedtohandicraftandsmallbusinesses. Paid
activities represent all the jobs for which individuals are wage earners (including work in agricul-
turalandbusinessactivities)andincludebonusesreceivedallalongtheyear. Subventionsaredis-
tributed by enterprises or the State for housing, food, energy, childbearing, childcare, health...53
Finally, remittances represent money sent back bychildren to their parentsor ﬁnancial help from
friends or relatives. For self-employment in agriculture or business, we construct net income de-
ﬁned as the income generated by the products sold plus the monetary value of products kept by
the household, minus the costs engaged for the production. We do not consider observations for
which informations related to costs or incomes were missing.
The aggregation of all kinds of revenue constraints us to consider yearly income for the whole
household and consequently to assume that total income is equally shared between each mem-
bers. However, we do not use the direct number of household members to obtain the individual
income, but assume some possible economies of scale in the household. Consequently, we use
the methodology suggested by(Deaton, 1997) and normalize the incomes bydividing them byna
where n is the number of the household members and a is an equivalence factor. In our empiri-
cal application, we will use a value of a = 0.8, a value than was chosen by Wan and Zhang (2006)
for their estimations on the same CHNS data. To get real incomes, we use the consumer price in-
dexes(CPIs) provided theChineseNationalBureauofStatistics. Weconsider provincialCPIs, with
a distinction between urbanand ruralareas, forall the yearsconsidered, with the1990 year as the
reference. In order to account for the spacial price differences in the reference year, incomes are
adjusted using the provincial (rural and urban) deﬂators constructed by Brandt and Holz (2006).
In table 3 are presented the values of the headcount index for the different periods of obser-
vation. In this paper, we consider the traditional US$1.08 and US$2.16 (latter mentioned as US$1
and US$2 for convenience) per day poverty lines in 1996 PPP . In the context of China, the deﬁni-
tion of a relevant poverty line is the object of great debates (Fan et al., 2002; Hanmer et al., 2004;
Gregory et al., 2005; Chen and Ravallion, 2007). Some authors argue that it is important to distin-
53 For the 1991 survey, food coupons received by households are isolated from the subventions. We consequently
include them in the subventionto make database comparable.
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guish the rural and urban areas (Chen and Ravallion, 2007), and even consider speciﬁc poverty
lines corresponding to adequate consumption baskets for each area (Gregory et al., 2005). Nev-
ertheless, we choose the commonly used US$1 and US$2 lines as we realize a general analysis of
poverty in China and as these two measures are the ones used in the context of the Millennium
Development Goals. Thebottom partof thecumulativedistributionfunctionsforeachsurveyare
reported in ﬁgure 5.
Table 3: Values of the headcount index in China during the period 1990-2003.
Year 1990 1996 1999 2003
US$1 16.2 6.8 11.2 13.3
(0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
US$2 36.5 14.3 17.9 18.0
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Note: standard errors in parentheses using a
bootstrap procedurewith 200 replications.

































Note: The solid and dashed vertical lines represents the US$1 and US$2 per day
povertylines.
Figure 5: The distributionof incomes in China from1990 to 2003.
Considering the 3, we note that after a drop in poverty between 1990 and 1996, a slight in-
crease occurs in China since the end of the 1990’s. This seems surprising as we know that China
has experienced a huge growth since the beginning of the 1980’s. On the other hand, our ﬁgures
are not totally supported by other studies related to poverty in China and which tend to demon-
strate a constant decrease of poverty since the movement of reforms initiated by the end of the
1970’s. Nevertheless, some other authors underline short episodes of increase in the headcount
index. For instance, Chen and Ravallion (2007) for the whole China and Wan and Zhang (2006)
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for theruralareasnote aslight increase in2000. Thedifferenceswe canstress between our results
and other studies ones are essentially due to the data structure and our deﬁnition of income. The
CHNS database is highly detailed and many rival hypothesis can be done concerning which in-
come and costs must or not be considered. This can have important impact on the results. With
this caveat in mind, our conclusions concerning China’s poverty need to be taken with caution.
However, as this is not the central goal of our paper, problems concerning data will not inﬂuence
the major results concerningthe differencesbetween decompositions done with scale invariance
and the ones based on translation invariance.
We can have a closer look at the level of poverty looking at the incomes distribution given
on ﬁgure 5. Thanks to this ﬁgure, we clearly see that there has been a huge decrease in poverty
between 1990 and 1996 using the US$2 poverty line but that after this date, and for the poorest
individuals, no signiﬁcant evolution can be drawn. These distributions emphasize a decrease of
inequalities for the highest quartile but not for the lowest ones. This is in coherence with the
evolution of the distribution of wealth in China as we see since few years the development of a
new middle class which begins to balance with the enrichment of a narrow share of the Chinese
population.
4.2 “Leftist” vs “rightist” effects
In this paragraph, we focus on the comparisons of the differences of the estimated effects ob-
tained through the two limiting views presented in the preceding sections, that is those based
on scale and translation invariance. Tables 4 and 5 respectively present the estimations using
the Datt and Ravallion (1992) and the Shapley decomposition techniques for the period 1990-
2003 and the sub-periods 1990-1996, 1996-1999 and 1999-2003.54 The ﬁgures included in these
tables give the total variations of the headcount index, the growth and inequality effects in per-
centage pointsaswell astheir relative contribution(trade-off)to povertyreduction. Forinstance,
looking at the results based on scale invariance in table 4 for the period 1990-2003 and for the
US$1 poverty line, we can observe that poverty has decreased by about 2.9 percentage points.
Decomposing this evolution into growth and inequality effects, we ﬁnd that poverty would have
decreased by 8.9 percentage points thanks to growth if inequalities had remained stable during
the period. In parallel, if the growth rate had been null, the evolution of inequalities would have
increased poverty by 0.7 percentage points. The same interpretations hold for the Shapley de-
composition results given in table 5.
As noted earlier, our objective is not to promote any of the two techniques, but to emphasize
the judgment differences involved by a change in the conception of inequality. By and large, the
twodecompositions techniquesyieldthesameconclusions, theonlysalientdifferencebeingwith
the“leftist”inequalityeffectfortheperiod1990-1996usingtheUS$1povertyline(2.55percentage
points for the Shapley decomposition versus −1.63 with the Datt and Ravallion (1992) approach).
At ﬁrst, it is important to stress that the theoretical results summed up in tables 1 and 2 are
conﬁrmed by the empirical results presented in tables 4 and 5. We are in the case of a positive










































Table 4: “Rightist” and “leftist” decompositions of poverty spells in China 1990-2003using the Datt and Ravallion (1992)technique.
Axiom Scale invariance Translation invariance
1990-1996 1996-1999 1999-2003 1990-2003 1990-1996 1996-1999 1999-2003 1990-2003
US$1 poverty line
Total -9.44 4.44 2.04 -2.96 -9.44 4.44 2.04 -2.96
(% point) [−10.2,−8.67] [3.65,5.16] [1.18,2.96] [−3.93,−1.99] [−10.2,−8.67] [3.65,5.16] [1.18,2.96] [−3.93,−1.99]
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Growth -2.7 -1.36 -1.39 -8.98 -16.2 -6.85 -11.3 -16.3
(% point) [−3.54,−1.52] [−1.59,−1.17] [−1.65,−0.97] [−9.74,−8.07] [−16.9,−11.4] [−7.32,−6.4] [−11.9,−10.7] [−17,−15.7]
(0.005) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.015) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Inequality -8.13 5.91 2.98 0.76 -1.63 19.1 13.5 24.2
(% point) [−9.21,−7.29] [5.1,6.64] [2.11,3.82] [−0.31,1.73] [−5.64,1.88] [17.3,20.7] [11.3,15] [21.8,26.3]
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.019) (0.009) (0.01) (0.012)
Residual 1.39 -0.11 0.46 5.26 8.35 -7.84 -0.19 -10.9
(% point) [0.85,2.02] [−0.40,0.38] [0.10,0.69] [4.58,5.93] [4.85,8.73] [−9.57,−5.83] [−1.73,2.06] [−13.1,−8.38]
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.01) (0.009) (0.01) (0.012)
Trade-off 0.33 -0.23 -0.46 -11.8 9.91 -0.35 -0.83 -0.67
(G/D) [0.17,0.45] [−0.29,−0.18] [−0.68,−0.28] [−128,117] [−108,97.7] [−0.40,−0.32] [−1.01,−0.73] [−0.75,−0.60]
(0.073) (0.027) (0.103) (5335) (213) (0.022) (0.071) (0.038)
US$2 poverty line
Total -22.2 3.56 0.072 -18.6 -22.2 3.56 0.072 -18.6
(% point) [−23.2,−21.2] [2.58,4.46] [−0.95,1.14] [−19.7,−17.5] [−23.2,−21.2] [2.58,4.46] [−0.95,1.14] [−19.7,−17.5]
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Growth -4.93 -3.83 -2.39 -17.9 -21.1 -12.2 -17.9 -36.6
(% point) [−6.91,−3.34] [−4.28,−3.12] [−2.78,−1.65] [−19.1,−16.3] [−29.7,−12.7] [−14.8,−11.1] [−18.6,−12.3] [−37.4,−35.7]
(0.009) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.044) (0.012) (0.017) (0.004)
Inequality -19.7 7.82 2.01 -10.4 -13.4 18.3 13.1 9.04
(% point) [−21.3,−18.1] [6.79,8.74] [1.11,3.15] [−11.8,−8.95] [−17.2,−9.76] [16.6,19.9] [10.3,14.6] [6.7,10.9]
(0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.019) (0.009) (0.01) (0.011)
Residual 2.47 -0.43 0.45 9.73 12.3 -2.47 4.92 8.99
(% point) [1.93,3.3] [−1.05,0.10] [−0.26,0.66] [8.73,10.5] [7.51,17.4] [−3.05,−0.41] [1.74,6.12] [7.1,11.5]
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.025) (0.007) (0.011) (0.012)
Trade-off 0.25 -0.48 -1.19 1.72 1.58 -0.67 -1.37 -4.05
(G/D) [0.16,0.37] [−0.58,−0.39] [−2.14,−0.59] [1.45,2.08] [0.75,3.04] [−0.80,−0.62] [−1.54,−1.1] [−5.48,−3.33]
(0.056) (0.048) (0.386) (0.161) (0.576) (0.051) (0.107) (0.586)










































Table 5: “Rightist” and “leftist” decompositions of poverty spells in China 1990-2003using theShapley technique.
Axiom Scale invariance Translation invariance
1990-1996 1996-1999 1999-2003 1990-2003 1990-1996 1996-1999 1999-2003 1990-2003
US$1 poverty line
Total -9.44 4.44 2.04 -2.96 -9.44 4.44 2.04 -2.96
(% point) [−10.2,−8.67] [3.65,5.16] [1.18,2.96] [−3.93,−1.99] [−10.2,−8.67] [3.65,5.16] [1.18,2.96] [−3.93,−1.99]
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Growth -2 -1.42 -1.16 -6.35 -12 -10.8 -11.4 -21.7
(% point) [−2.6,−1.08] [−1.6,−1.16] [−1.35,−0.84] [−6.9,−5.58] [−13.8,−7.75] [−11.7,−9.77] [−12.3,−10.2] [−22.9,−20.3]
(0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.016) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Inequality -7.44 5.86 3.21 3.39 2.55 15.2 13.4 18.8
(% point) [−8.59,−6.56] [5.09,6.54] [2.32,4] [2.38,4.24] [−1.81,4.4] [14.2,16.1] [12.2,14.3] [17.5,19.9]
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.016) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Trade-off 0.26 -0.24 -0.36 -1.87 -4.71 -0.70 -0.84 -1.16
(G/D) [0.12,0.37] [−0.29,−0.19] [−0.50,−0.23] [−2.6,−1.48] [−29.9,33.3] [−0.75,−0.66] [−0.90,−0.78] [−1.22,−1.1]
(0.066) (0.025) (0.067) (0.295) (259.8) (0.023) (0.032) (0.028)
US$2 poverty line
Total -22.2 3.56 0.072 -18.6 -22.2 3.56 0.072 -18.6
(% point) [−23.2,−21.2] [2.58,4.46] [−0.95,1.14] [−19.7,−17.5] [−23.2,−21.2] [2.58,4.46] [−0.95,1.14] [−19.7,−17.5]
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Growth -3.7 -4.04 -2.17 -13 -15 -13.5 -15.5 -32.1
(% point) [−5.39,−2.3] [−4.5,−3.39] [−2.6,−1.67] [−14.2,−11.7] [−21.1,−8.87] [−15.5,−12.2] [−16.4,−11.2] [−33.2,−30.6]
(0.008) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.031) (0.01) (0.013) (0.006)
Inequality -18.5 7.61 2.24 -5.54 -7.23 17 15.5 13.5
(% point) [−20.2,−16.7] [6.64,8.47] [1.3,3.23] [−6.85,−4.2] [−13.2,−1.16] [15.8,19] [11.5,16.4] [12.3,14.5]
(0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.031) (0.009) (0.012) (0.006)
Trade-off 0.2 -0.53 -0.96 2.35 2.07 -0.79 -0.99 -2.37
(G/D) [0.11,0.31] [−0.62,−0.44] [−1.7,−0.63] [1.76,3.34] [0.66,17.1] [−0.85,−0.74] [−1.06,−0.92] [−2.56,−2.23]
(0.052) (0.045) (0.276) (0.394) (8.37) (0.029) (0.036) (0.087)
Note: 95% conﬁdence intervals in brackets and standard errors in parentheses using a bootstrap procedurewith 500 replications.
3
34 AN APPLICATION TO POVERTY IN CHINA, 1990-2004
growth rate (µY > µX) with initial and ﬁnal mean incomes that are both above the poverty line
(µY > z and µX > z). Consequently, we ﬁnd in all cases that the negative growth effect is more
importantin the translationinvariance case thanin thescale invariance one. Moreover thetrans-
lation inequality effect is larger than the effect based on scale invariance. When the values are
negative, a “leftist” observer would then attribute a lower contribution of inequality changes to
variations of the headcount index than a “rightist” observer. On the other hand, with a positive
inequality effect, he would think that inequality changes hampers more poverty alleviation than
the “rightist” one. Of course, these results hold for both the Datt and Ravallion (1992) and the
Shapley decomposition techniques.
Whatis also interestingis thedifferencesrelativeto thetrade-offsbetween thegrowth andthe
inequality effects. They can be found in the tables 1 and 2 and are measured by the ratio G/D.
We clearly see that the weights given to growth relative to inequalities in the explanation of ob-
servedpovertytrendsarehighlydifferentbetweenthe“leftist”and“rightist”views. Thesamephe-
nomenon happens whateverpoverty line and decomposition approach are chosen. For example,
for theUS$1 povertyline, theShapleygrowth effectmeasured with thescale invariance is approx-
imately four times less important than the inequality effect when we consider the evolution of
poverty between 1990 and 1996, whereas it is 4.71 times more important than the inequality ef-
fect once we move to the translation invariance case. For the same period and the same poverty
line, the Datt and Ravallion trade-offsare 0.33 for the scale invariance and 9.91 for the translation
one. No clear relationship appears between the type of invariance chosen and the more or less
high trade-offs that are observed. This underlines even more the need for a sensitivity analysis of
the poverty decomposition to invariance preferences.
To illustrate the importance of the axiomatic choice, let’s have a look at the results of the Datt
and Ravallion decomposition for the period 1990-2003 and for the US$1 poverty line. We note
that the growth effect for the translation invariance (GT = −16.3) is nearly two times higher than
that for the scale invariance (GS = −8.98). Considering the inequality effect, the difference is
even larger, the “leftist” effect (DS = 24.2) being more than 30 times higher than the “rightist”
one (DT =0.76). To test the statistical signiﬁcance of these results, we computed 95% conﬁdence
intervals for each effect using a bootstrap procedure with 500 replications and resampling at the
household level. In most cases, we ﬁnd that these differences are signiﬁcant as interval crossings
are rarely noted.
The most impressive consequence of invariance axiom changes is that a modiﬁcation of ethi-
cal preferences may induce a change in the sign of the inequality effect. Comparing the results of
thescale andtranslationinvariance,we observeopposite(andsigniﬁcantlydifferent)signsforthe
inequality effects for the period 1990-2003 with the US$2 poverty line whatever decomposition
technique is chosen. The same phenomenon is observed in table 5 for the sub-period 1990-1996
and the US$1 povertyline but only with the Shapley decomposition approach. But ascan be seen
thankstotheconﬁdenceinterval, thepositive “leftist” effectisnotstatistically differentfromzero.
Consequentlyforthissub-periodandthispovertyline, moving froma"rightist"toa"leftist"point
of view implies that the effect of the changes in the relative distribution of incomes on poverty is
not signiﬁcantly different from zero anymore.
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Concomitantly to this result, another major observation can be made about the dependency
of the ordering of effects to invariance choices for many sub-periods. For instance, the Shapley
growth effectfortheUS$1povertylineishigherduringthe1996-1999 periodwhenusingthescale
invariance (G′S
96−99 = −1.42 < −1.16 =G′T




on the same subperiods, for both the Shapley growth effectsat the US$2 povertyline andthe Datt
and Ravallion growth effects at the US$1 poverty line. Consequently, it seems that moving from
a “rightist” to a “leftist” point of view implies a different perception of the range of the impact of
growth or inequality on poverty. However, it is important to stress that differences between these
estimated growth effects are not statistically signiﬁcant except for the scale invariance inequality
effects obtained with the Shapley decomposition technique at the US$2 poverty line.
Anotherimportantfactisthatalltheseresultscruciallydependonthelevelofthepovertyline.
Figures6and7presentthevalueofthedifferentestimatedeffectsaswellasobservedpovertyvari-
ations as a function of the poverty line. At ﬁrst, these ﬁgures conﬁrm the meaningful differences
that we ﬁnd between the scale and the translation invariance decompositions. As the range of
observed values for the translation invariance is wider, the curves relative to GT and DT are re-
spectively below and above the ones forGS and DS. Most of the time, the evolutions of the effects
for the two types of invariance are parallel. Nevertheless, we clearly see on the ﬁgure 6a for the
1990-2003 period and on the ﬁgure 6c for the period 1996-1999 a divergence of the growth effects
between thescale andthetranslationinvariancesasthepovertyline increases. Therefore, itisim-
portant, as stressed in the poverty ordering literature (Atkinson, 1987), to analyse the sensibility
of results to the level of the poverty line.55
4.3 Intermediate effects
In the preceding section, we have shown that choosing the scale invariance as the sole relevant
inequality view in the context of the decomposition of poverty variations provide conclusions
that may not be shared by individuals which preferences are closer to views based on translation
invariance. In the following paragraphs, we introduces intermediate invariance in the empirical
analysissoastogetamoresubtleanddeeperanalysisoftheeffectsofchangesinethicpreferences
related to invariance.
First, we have to remind that the intermediate invariance axiom we are using is the one of
Yoshida (2005) since it is the sole described in section 2.3 that is suitable for poverty decomposi-
tions. Consequently, the parameterwhich is determinantto thisanalysis isσ, asit describesposi-
tion of individuals between the “rightist” and “leftist” views. The estimated effects corresponding
to intermediatepositions arereportedin ﬁgure 8fortheDattandRavallion (1992) decomposition
technique and in ﬁgure 9 when using the Shapley decomposition approach. It can be seen from
each of these ﬁgures that proposition 2 is respected since curves are monotonically (weakly) in-
creasing or decreasing. However, it isparticularlyinterestingto notethattheestimated effectsare
sometimes stable on some signiﬁcant portions of the deﬁnition interval of the parameter σ. This
55 For a comprehensive survey of povertyorderings, see Zheng (2000).
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(a) 1990-2003


































































































































Figure 6: “Rightist” and “leftist” decompositions of poverty spells in China 1990-2003using
theDatt and Ravallion (1992)technique.
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(a) 1990-2003


































































































































Figure 7: “Rightist” and “leftist” decompositions of poverty spells in China 1990-2003using
the Shapley technique.
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is in particularthe case in ﬁgure 8a forthegrowth effectsobtained throughtheDatt andRavallion
(1992) decomposition technique on the periods 1990-2003, 1996-1999 and 1999-2003.
(a) Growtheffect, z =US$1






























(b) Inequality effect, z =US$1























(c) Growth effect, z =US$2



































(d) Inequality effect, z =US$2




















Figure 8: Intermediate (Yoshida, 2005)decomposition of poverty spells in China 1990-2003
using theDatt and Ravallion (1992)technique.
We have noted in the preceding paragraph two major differences once we adopt translation
invariance: a change in the sign of the inequality effect for the period 1990-2003 and 1990-1997,
and an inversion of the ordering of the growth effects on poverty variations between the peri-
ods 1996-1999 and 1999-2003. These results translates differences between two opposite ethic
preferences. Thanks to the intermediate methodology, we are able to use a continuum of ethic
preferences and consequently determine the levels of σ which correspond to a reversal of the
conclusions.
Concerningthechangeofsignunderlinedfortheinequalityeffectrelatedtothewholeperiod,
the sensibility of the results can be appreciated from ﬁgures 8d and 9d. They describe the evolu-
tion of the different effects with the parameterσ. We clearly see that the changes of sign occur for
avalueofσ=0.5fortheDattandRavalliondecompositionandaround0.9fortheShapleydecom-
position. Whenlooking attheﬁgure 10a, which addstheconﬁdence intervalsto inequalityeffects
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(a) Growtheffect, z =US$1



































(b) Inequality effect, z =US$1



























(c) Growth effect, z =US$2






























(d) Inequality effect, z =US$2
























Figure 9: Intermediate (Yoshida, 2005)decomposition of poverty spells in China 1990-2003
using the Shapley technique.
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for the whole period, interesting differences appear between two considered decomposition ap-
proaches. For both of them, we stress values of σ for which the inequality effect is sometimes
positive, neutral or negative. Using the Datt and Ravallion (1992) decomposition technique, the
positive impact is found for σ inferior to 0.42, the neutral one for σ comprised between 0.42 and
0.62, and the negative one for σ superior to 0.62. With the second technique, the cut-offs are re-
spectively 0.82 and 0.91. Consequently, the observation of a positive Shapley inequality effects
(D′ > 0) which translate the perception of an harmful impact of inequality variations on poverty
during the period 1990-2003, occurs untilhigher values of σ thanfor the Datt and Ravallion ones.
If we consider that invariance preferences are uniformly distributed along the values of σ, this
implies that with the Shapley methodology, more people will tend to have a “leftist” view of the
inequality impact than those who will have a more “rightist” position. Moreover, we note that the
conﬁdence intervals do not overlap, suggesting that the differences between the two methodolo-
gies are also signiﬁcant.56
Fortheperiod1990-1996withtheShapleydecompositiontechnique, wealsopreviouslynoted
a change of sign. This is conﬁrmed by the ﬁgure 9b as the corresponding curve for the inequality
effectcrossesthex-axesforσ =0.3. However,wehavenotedintable5thatthe“rightist”inequality
effect obtained through the Shapley decomposition technique is not signiﬁcantly different from
zero. Figure 10b focuses on the curve we are interested in, and gives the conﬁdence intervals.
We emphasize now clearly that individuals whose ethical preferences are below σ=0.53 consider
that inequalities changes had a non signiﬁcant impact on the evolution of poverty during the
period 1990-1996 and that individuals whose preferences are above this value may feel that it sig-
niﬁcantlycontributesto povertyalleviation. Itis also interestingtonotethattheinequalityeffects
D are never signiﬁcantly different from those corresponding to the Shapley decomposition.
As noted earlier, ethical preferences changes may reverse the ordering of the effects between
many periods. If we take a look at the growth effects issued from both Datt and Ravallion (1992)
and Shapley decompositions techniques, we ﬁnd that with the US$2 poverty line, the 1996-1999
growth effect is roughly equal to the 1999-2003 one for respective values of σ that are approxi-
mately comprised between 0.4 and 0.72. For values that are lower than 0.4, individuals consider
that the growth reducing effect has been larger between 1996 and 1999 than between 1999 and
2003. The converse conclusion holds for σ>0.72.
4.4 Some more words aboutgrowth and redistribution in China
Coming back to the Chinese context, we can draw important conclusions on the evolution of
poverty and the role played by growth and relative distribution changes.
First, if we look at the whole period 1990-2003, we underline a decrease in poverty that is
mostly due to the high growth rates that were observed during this period. This result is partic-
ularly robust since it is consistent with all inequality views and poverty lines considered in the
56 These areonly observationsas our goal is not to promoteone or theother methodology. Howeverit is important
to stress these differences as they give rise to opposite conclusions in some cases. For instance, when we consider the
valueofσ comprisedbetween0.62 and0.82, weclearly seethattheinequalityeffect ispositiveconsideringtheShapley
decompositionandnegativeoncewemovetotheDattandRavallion’s one. Consequently,thisunderlinesthepotential
need for a clear choice between the two methodologies, or the deﬁnition a third procedure.
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(a) 1990-2003, z =US$2


































(b) 1990-1996, z =US$1






















Note: Thearea between thedashed curves representsthe95% conﬁdenceintervalobtained througha boot-
strap procedurewith 500 replications.
Figure 10: Sensibility of theinequality effects to ethical preferences parameter σ.
analysis. On the other hand, the effects of inequality changes on the variation of poverty are al-
ways positive when we consider the US$1 poverty line but depends on the ethic preferences in
terms of invariance when we look at the results for the US$2 poverty line. In the later case, in-
equalities tend to decrease poverty considering the “rightist” view but increase it once we adopt
the “leftist” point of view. It is well known that China has experienced a huge growth since the re-
forms movement initiated at the end of the 1970’s. But in parallel to this economic development,
inequalities raised dramatically. The harmful impact of inequalities on poverty for the period
1990-2003, stressed in the US$1 case and in the US$2 case only for the translation invariance de-
composition, are thus not surprising. These results are consistent with those found in studies
related to Chinese poverty. For instance, the articles of Chen and Wang (2001); Fan et al. (2002);
Hanmer et al. (2004); Gregory et al. (2005); Wan and Zhang (2006) and Chen and Ravallion (2007)
all demonstrate the positive role of growth in decreasing poverty in China but the negative role of
increasing inequalities. Explanations of this phenomenon can be found in the rural late develop-
ment (Hanmer et al., 2004; Gregory et al., 2005), or in the evolution of the labor market (Fan et al.,
2002), but our analysis cannot give any support to these hypotheses.
Withacloser look atthe evolutionof povertythroughtime, we noteaveryimportantdecrease
between 1990and1996butthenaslight increase between1996 and2003. Thisunstableevolution
of povertyhasbeen previously emphasized insome studies onpovertyin China(Chen andRaval-
lion, 2007; Gregory et al., 2005). Considering the recent increase of poverty, we see that its main
cause is the positive impact of inequalities, a result that does not depend on the chosen inequal-
ityview. Thismeansthatwhateverdecomposition procedure, invariancepreferencesandpoverty
line are chosen, growing inequalities in Chinahave worsened thesituation of thepoorest popula-
tion. In a “pro-poor” growth analysis à la Kakwani and Pernia (2000), both “leftist”, intermediate
and “rightist” observers would then consider that growth can be deemed “anti-poor” on the peri-
ods 1996-1999 and 1999-2003, and surely more when moving from a “rightist” to a “leftist” point
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of view. The political recommendation issued from these conclusions join the ones previously
done by other researchers: there is a important need to associate growth with a more “pro-poor”
redistributive policy if the Chinese government wants to succeed in alleviating extreme poverty.
5 Concluding remarks
In these few lines, we will not draw policy recommendations but methodological ones. From our
pointofview, theissues illustratedinthepresentpapercouldleadtothethreefollowing attitudes:
i) standardization of the practices,
ii) consistency with personal ethical preferences,
iii) sensibility analysis to ethical preferences.
Attitudei)consistsinthedeﬁnitionofastandardviewthatshouldbeusedbyeveryeconomist.
The main argument in favor of this strategy is that it deﬁnes a common analyzing framework and
helps to make different studies comparable. Moreover, we should recognize that it corresponds
to the attitudethatpresentlyseems to prevail since most economists implicitly feelinaccordance
with inequality views based on scale invariance. However, we would like to stress thateconomists
should be aware of the normative implications of this particular axiomatic choice and of the po-
tential discrepancy between the ethical preferences reﬂected by scale invariance and their own
personal preferences. At least should they clearly express on which axioms are based their analy-
ses when chosen measures are compatible with many rival axioms.
The second strategy reﬂects the opposite strategy. It implies economists to make use on the
sole measures that are consistent with their own personal ethical preferences. A major problem
is that knowing oneself, or at least his own feelings, and expressing these preferences through
rigorous mathematical properties is a difﬁcult task.57 Kolm (1995, p.301) observes that “the view
concerning the comparative justice of covariations in incomes depends on the setting of the ques-
tion, and, of course, on the political reading of this setting. It depends on the levels of the real
incomes, and in particular on the average level and on the levels of the lowest and of the highest;
on theconceived solidarityor duty ofsolidarity;of courseon theoriginof thesetransformations;on
past and expected history;on the fact thatthe consideredvariationisan increaseora decrease;and
so on.” Of course this attitude raises the problem of the comparability of researchers’ works since
most individuals are not likely to speak the same “language”.
Finally, attitude iii) consists in not choosing for the reader which inequality view he should
adopt, and presenting a sensibility analyses of the results to axiomatic changes so as the reader
can ﬁnd which results ﬁt his own conception of inequality.58 As illustrated by our application on
57 It is particularly interestingto note that after hours and endeavours devoted to the review of the different invari-
ance axioms suggested in the literature and their implications, the authors of the present paper are still not able to
express precisely their own feelings on this precise subject.
Moreover, economists’ tastes may be to some extent endogenous as noted by Amiel and Cowell (1992, p. 22):
“Wideranging policy decisions can be inﬂuenced by ideas about inequality; these ideas are, in turn, inﬂuenced by the
way individuals are trained to think about the issues.”
58 Kolm (1969, p.148) advocates that the economist “is an observer of citizens’ value judgements and opinions, as
he is an observer of their tastes concerning consumers’ goods.[...] Useful normative economics is therefore a positive
science since its basis is the objective observation of subjective opinions.” Thus citizens’ preferences should be given the
pre-eminence over the economist’s tastes.
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Chinese data, considering different inequality views can reverse conclusions but may also im-
prove the robustnessof some results, andthusgive more convincing argumentsforpolicy recom-
mendations. This corresponds to a traditional attitude in welfare economics, in particular for the
description of poverty and inequality trends. For instance, when comparing different distribu-
tions, it is common to make use of many different measures like the Atkinson’s (1970) inequality
measures, which are based on classical von Neumann and Morgenstern utilitarianism, and Gini
indices which are derived from rank-dependant expected utility models (see Gajdos, 2001, for a
review). In the same spirit, it is common to ﬁndstudies thatuse both Fosteret al. (1984) and Sen’s
(1976) poverty measures.59
Concerning the speciﬁc subject of the decomposition of observed poverty variations, atti-
tudes ii) and iii) call for the development of appropriate inequality and poverty measures. In
the present paper, we focus on the headcount index since it is the sole known poverty measure
(cf. proposition 1) that simultaneously complies with all the aforementioned invariance axioms,
and thus leaves room to individual preferences for the interpretation of its variations. Indeed,
the headcount index is considered by most authors as a poor measure of poverty since it does
not account for the intensity and inequality dimensions of poverty. As a consequence, many
distribution-sensitive povertymeasures havebeen proposed by(Watts, 1968; Sen, 1976; Kakwani,
1980; Clark et al., 1981; Foster et al., 1984; Hagenaars, 1987), but each one is consistent with a
uniqueinvarianceaxiomsothatcomparisonsoftheir“leftist”, “rightist”andintermediatedecom-
positions are not possible. As a result, the evaluation of the relative contribution of growth and
redistribution to poverty alleviation using distribution-sensitive measures for various inequality
views can only be performed with the help of classes of invariance-sensitive poverty measures,
that is poverty measures which features some parametersthat reﬂect invariance preferences. Re-
cent propositions by Zheng (1997) are to our knowledge the sole tentative to provide such tools
and should inspire furtherresearch.60
Appendices
A The (V,υ)-invariance axiom in practice
The major concern with the implementation of the (V,υ)-invariance axiom is the presence of the
reference distributionV thatgenerallycannotbe directly usedto ﬁndthecounterfactualincomes
distributions needed for the computation of the growth and inequality effects. For convenience,
suppose that V is on the two-dimension subspace SX deﬁned by the vectors X
µX and I. We also
59 Inthesetwoexamples, oneshouldnotethatorderingcriterionshavebeendevelopedsoastodetermineinwhich
cases differentinequalityandpovertyindices wouldrespectivelyyield thesameconclusions. Consequentlywesuggest
that furtherresearch could be devoted to the ﬁndind of orderingconditions for many invarianceaxioms.
60 The indices suggested by Zheng (2007c) are not included in the present paper because they are not yet well doc-
umented. More precisely, it can be demonstrated that the proposed Krtscha-typepoverty index does not comply with
the non-linear invariance axiom presented in section 2.3.2. Moreover the Dalton-Hagenaars index developed by the
author relies on an unknown invariance axiom. Without explicit formulation of the transformations that preserves
inequality, the computation of the counterfactualincomes cannot be done. Consequently, this precludes a decompo-
sition of the variationsof this measure.
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consider thatY is of size nY thatmay be different from n. In the original version of the axiom (del
Rio and Ruiz-Castillo, 2000), a distribution Y can be directly compared with a distribution X only
if it belongs to SX. For the purpose of decomposing poverty spells, V can generally not be used
for the computation of the inequality effect D since the transformed distribution would not be
on the same subspace SY as Y . In order to make the comparison feasible with each distribution
Y ∈ Dα, one needs to ﬁnd the distribution V ′
µV′ that corresponds to the projection of the refer-
ence distribution V
µV into the subspace SY . In the spirit of (Alonso-Villar and del Rio, 2007a), we
can deﬁne V ′
µV′ as the distribution in SY which exhibits the same Euclidean distance from perfect
equality as V
µV . Thus, V ′ must be chosen so as to respect:




















To get a unique distribution V ′, we have to add some constraints to equation (A.1). If we nor-
































   










Rearranging equation (A.4) and using equation (A.1), we obtain:
ζ=
       


















































44C THE (V,υ)-INVARIANCEAXIOM AND UNIT-CONSISTENCY
B The (V,υ)-invariance axiom and lemma 1







In order to get a transformed distribution Φ(X,µY ) which mean value is equal to µY , the two
parameters must respect the following condition ζ2 = 1−ζ1. Moreover, since VX should Lorenz
dominate the distribution X, we observe ζ1 >1. Consequently, we get:




























Comparing with equation (2.12), we can conclude that lemma 1 will be fulﬁlled if and only
if V is chosen so that ζ1 6 υ−1. Another important conclusion is that the transformed distribu-
tion corresponding to scale invariance can be obtained from X only if VX is equal to X up to a
scale factor. On the other hand, no condition is imposed for the value of ζ1 so as to obtain the
transformed distribution that would correspond to translation invariance.
C The (V,υ)-invariance axiom and unit-consistency
In a recent paper, Zheng (2004) argued that anyinequality measure based on the (V,υ)-inequality
(del Rio and Ruiz-Castillo, 2000) view violates unit consistency. His demonstration is based on









+(1−υ)(xi −µX +1). (C.1)
and is weighted mean of the relative and absolute Lorenz curves.62 To compare the distributions
X and Y , we have to draw the corresponding intermediate Lorenz curve for Y . Following the









+(1−υ)(yi −µY +1). (C.2)
61 The deﬁnition of the adequate Lorenz criterion is quite easy since one only need the use the equation of the
invariance axiom on the generalized Lorenz curve deﬁned by Shorrocks (1983) so as to normalize mean income to
unity.
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In order to prove that unit-consistency is not respected, X and Y must be chosen so as there
exists a value υ∗ ∈ [0,ι] such that the two distributions can be considered as exhibiting the same
degree of inequality. In otherwords, one distribution should be relative-Lorenz dominated by the
other which absolute-Lorenz dominates the former. Let X relative-Lorenz dominates Y . So one














+(1−υ∗)(yi −µY +1) (C.3)
If a smaller unit of income is then used (each income is scaled up by the same constant, the
respect of unit-consistency implies that we should still feel that the two distributions are equally














+(1−υ∗)(λyi −λµY +1) (C.4)










yi −µy +1 (C.5)
Zheng (2004) then concludes on the basis of (C.3) that unit-consistency is violated. How-
ever, this result is due to a misunderstanding of del Rio and Ruiz-Castillo’s (2000) approach. The
author assumes that the part of the incremental income that is not equally shared between in-
come receivers must be distributed in proportion of their respective relative contribution to total
income.63 Infact, thispartmustbe distributedwith respectto income sharesofareferencedistri-
bution which should bethe same whencomparing X and Y so asa unique value ofυ can be used.















Unit-consistencyisnotviolatedifthedifferencesL(λY, j,υ)−L(Y, j,υ)andL(λX, j,υ)−L(X, j,υ)





































+1−υ∗ =(λ−1)L(Y, j,υ∗) (C.9)









+1−υ∗ =(λ−1)L(X, j,υ∗) (C.10)
Since we supposed L(Y, j,υ∗) = L(X, j,υ∗), equations (C.9) and (C.10) lead to the conclusion
that L(λY, j,υ∗)=L(λX, j,υ∗), QED.
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